On paper, Europe has all the resources it needs to defend itself in the absence of support by the United States. But the subordination of Europe’s interests to the national interests of its member states is a luxury the continent can no longer afford.
WARSAW – US President Donald Trump’s hostile regime has finally forced Europe to wake up. With US officials calling into question the transatlantic alliance, Germany’s incoming chancellor, Friedrich Merz, recently persuaded lawmakers to revise the country’s “debt brake” so that defense spending can be boosted. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has called for an €800 billion ($872 billion) fund to strengthen the EU’s hard power. And UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer has pledged to increase defense spending to 2.5% of GDP by 2027, hoping to hit 3% by 2030.
All of this is long overdue. As Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk put it in early March, it is absurd that “500 million Europeans are asking 300 million Americans to defend them against 140 million Russians.” Tusk meant that Europe has enormous defense potential, much greater than Russia and even greater than the United States, which has been guaranteeing Europe’s security since the end of World War II.
Tusk is right, of course: EU countries, plus the United Kingdom and Norway, are home to more than 500 million people. And if we add Turkey, Ukraine, and Canada, the figure approaches 700 million. These countries have about three million active soldiers and another 1-1.5 million reservists. Mathematically, therefore, Europe has nothing to fear even if Trump were to withdraw the US from NATO, or condition America’s response to aggression against an ally on, say, the ally’s elimination of tariffs on imports from the US.
That is hardly a far-fetched scenario. Poland must take seriously Elon Musk’s rude remarks to our foreign minister. Nor can we afford to dismiss the incoming US ambassador’s threat of “retaliation” if our government introduces a tax on Google and Apple. It is not lost on us that other countries with such a tax – but which do not share a border with Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine – have faced no similar threat by the US.
Today, no one can guarantee that Trump will honor Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, according to which an attack on one NATO member is an attack on all. Will the leader of an EU or NATO country attacked by Russia be publicly berated and bullied by Trump and Vice President J.D. Vance in the Oval Office, as happened to Volodymyr Zelensky?
Fortunately, European politicians are recognizing what needs to be done. French President Emmanuel Macron’s idea of extending France’s nuclear umbrella to cover all European NATO countries is a good starting point, as are discussions about constructing a European arms industry, which is virtually non-existent in many EU countries today. For example, the weapons and ammunition Portugal produces every year could pay for the purchase of only six or seven Abrams tanks.
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The problem lies in the lack of genuine market unification in Europe. Imagine that I run a one-man company in Poland. To operate in another EU country, I would have to go through so many formal procedures – registration, opening a bank account, learning about national regulations (the labor code, workplace safety rules, environmental protection, personal data protection, and more) – that it doesn’t make economic sense to try. In practice, a small company from one EU country cannot operate in another country.
The EU itself recognizes this, which is why it has created a special corporate status, officially called the European Company. Such a company can operate according to a single set of regulations throughout the EU, but it must be large, with subscribed capital of at least €120,000 ($131,000). The giants can operate from Madeira to Bratislava, but for most companies the single market is still an unattainable goal.
The F-35 fighter jet and the Abrams tank are produced by many companies and subcontractors in different states across the US. In Europe, by contrast, politicians in individual countries protect entire industries, because their re-election hinges on the national economy, not the EU-wide economy. This is why Poland buys tanks from South Korea, even though Germany, the UK, France, and Poland itself also produce tanks.
The subordination of Europe’s interests to the national interests of its member states is clearly visible today in the nuclear industry. Poland’s government wants a US-designed nuclear power plant in Poland, Hungary wants a Russian nuclear plant, and Germans want no nuclear power at all. On paper, however, the EU is a leader in this field – the world’s second-largest producer of nuclear-generated electricity after the US, with China far behind.
Europe can be a global power. But as long as the governments of EU countries are accountable only to their own countries’ voters, that will not happen. Instead, Europe will continue to discuss the need for joint munitions production or research projects, but artificial intelligence will continue to be developed separately in centers in France, the UK, Poland, or Germany.
We can then be happy that European countries have several million soldiers and a combined research budget exceeding that of China. But it will still be a paper tiger.
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Although Donald Trump got off to a good start, with equity prices hitting all-time highs in anticipation of pro-growth policies, investor confidence has vanished, tanking the stock market. With the president deliberately undermining the foundations of US prosperity, one must ask why he is doing it, and what could stop him.
offers three explanations for a set of policies that have sent investor confidence into a tailspin.
The US administration’s plan to impose “reciprocal” import tariffs could severely curtail key Indian exports, including chemicals, metals, auto parts, and pharmaceuticals, leading to job losses and undermining fiscal stability. India has little choice but to lower its own tariffs while negotiating improved access to the US market.
urges policymakers to brace for the impact – known and unknown – of the US administration’s trade policies.
Less than two months into his second presidency, Donald Trump has imposed sweeping tariffs on America’s three largest trading partners, with much more to come. This strategy not only lacks any credible theoretical foundations; it is putting the US on a path toward irrevocable economic and geopolitical decline.
WARSAW – US President Donald Trump’s hostile regime has finally forced Europe to wake up. With US officials calling into question the transatlantic alliance, Germany’s incoming chancellor, Friedrich Merz, recently persuaded lawmakers to revise the country’s “debt brake” so that defense spending can be boosted. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has called for an €800 billion ($872 billion) fund to strengthen the EU’s hard power. And UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer has pledged to increase defense spending to 2.5% of GDP by 2027, hoping to hit 3% by 2030.
All of this is long overdue. As Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk put it in early March, it is absurd that “500 million Europeans are asking 300 million Americans to defend them against 140 million Russians.” Tusk meant that Europe has enormous defense potential, much greater than Russia and even greater than the United States, which has been guaranteeing Europe’s security since the end of World War II.
Tusk is right, of course: EU countries, plus the United Kingdom and Norway, are home to more than 500 million people. And if we add Turkey, Ukraine, and Canada, the figure approaches 700 million. These countries have about three million active soldiers and another 1-1.5 million reservists. Mathematically, therefore, Europe has nothing to fear even if Trump were to withdraw the US from NATO, or condition America’s response to aggression against an ally on, say, the ally’s elimination of tariffs on imports from the US.
That is hardly a far-fetched scenario. Poland must take seriously Elon Musk’s rude remarks to our foreign minister. Nor can we afford to dismiss the incoming US ambassador’s threat of “retaliation” if our government introduces a tax on Google and Apple. It is not lost on us that other countries with such a tax – but which do not share a border with Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine – have faced no similar threat by the US.
Today, no one can guarantee that Trump will honor Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, according to which an attack on one NATO member is an attack on all. Will the leader of an EU or NATO country attacked by Russia be publicly berated and bullied by Trump and Vice President J.D. Vance in the Oval Office, as happened to Volodymyr Zelensky?
Fortunately, European politicians are recognizing what needs to be done. French President Emmanuel Macron’s idea of extending France’s nuclear umbrella to cover all European NATO countries is a good starting point, as are discussions about constructing a European arms industry, which is virtually non-existent in many EU countries today. For example, the weapons and ammunition Portugal produces every year could pay for the purchase of only six or seven Abrams tanks.
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At a time of escalating global turmoil, there is an urgent need for incisive, informed analysis of the issues and questions driving the news – just what PS has always provided.
Subscribe to Digital or Digital Plus now to secure your discount.
Subscribe Now
The problem lies in the lack of genuine market unification in Europe. Imagine that I run a one-man company in Poland. To operate in another EU country, I would have to go through so many formal procedures – registration, opening a bank account, learning about national regulations (the labor code, workplace safety rules, environmental protection, personal data protection, and more) – that it doesn’t make economic sense to try. In practice, a small company from one EU country cannot operate in another country.
The EU itself recognizes this, which is why it has created a special corporate status, officially called the European Company. Such a company can operate according to a single set of regulations throughout the EU, but it must be large, with subscribed capital of at least €120,000 ($131,000). The giants can operate from Madeira to Bratislava, but for most companies the single market is still an unattainable goal.
The F-35 fighter jet and the Abrams tank are produced by many companies and subcontractors in different states across the US. In Europe, by contrast, politicians in individual countries protect entire industries, because their re-election hinges on the national economy, not the EU-wide economy. This is why Poland buys tanks from South Korea, even though Germany, the UK, France, and Poland itself also produce tanks.
The subordination of Europe’s interests to the national interests of its member states is clearly visible today in the nuclear industry. Poland’s government wants a US-designed nuclear power plant in Poland, Hungary wants a Russian nuclear plant, and Germans want no nuclear power at all. On paper, however, the EU is a leader in this field – the world’s second-largest producer of nuclear-generated electricity after the US, with China far behind.
Europe can be a global power. But as long as the governments of EU countries are accountable only to their own countries’ voters, that will not happen. Instead, Europe will continue to discuss the need for joint munitions production or research projects, but artificial intelligence will continue to be developed separately in centers in France, the UK, Poland, or Germany.
We can then be happy that European countries have several million soldiers and a combined research budget exceeding that of China. But it will still be a paper tiger.