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Fawaz A. Gerges
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This week in Say More, PS talks with Fawaz A. Gerges, Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science, and the author of several books, including the forthcoming The Hundred Years’ War for Control of the Middle East: From Sykes-Picot to the Deal of the Century, and the newly revised ISIS: A History.

Project Syndicate: You recently wrote that while “al-Qaeda does have some chance of benefiting from the Taliban’s return to power” (though not nearly as much as many seem to believe ), “the same cannot be said” for the Islamic State, which the Taliban “fiercely opposes.” Since then, the local arm of ISIS – known as Islamic State-Khorasan, or ISIS-K – carried out a devastating attack on Kabul airport. Do you think the Taliban will be able to neutralize groups like ISIS-K and consolidate control of Afghanistan, or will the instability wrought by its takeover open the way for its enemies to gain ground? What should the international community do to mitigate the risks of further turmoil?

Fawaz A. Gerges: Since 2015, the Taliban and ISIS-K have been engaged in a fierce battle for hegemony in Afghanistan, particularly in the eastern Nangarhar province. The clash is not just about territorial control; it is a struggle over who will lead the militant Islamist movement and ensure its “theological purity.”

Interestingly, the Taliban and the US military at times informally joined ranks against ISIS, crippling its local affiliate by 2019 after killing many of its hardened lieutenants. Despite these operational setbacks, however, ISIS-K poses a lethal threat in Afghanistan, with about 1,500 to 2,200 combatants. And while the group does not have the capacity to conduct major attacks against the United States and its Western allies, it could target neighboring Pakistan, Central Asian countries, China, or Iran.

Ultimately, the Taliban are more powerful and will most likely crush ISIS-K militarily. Moreover, the US and its Western allies have expressed their willingness to work with the Taliban to prevent ISIS-K from establishing a base of operations in Afghanistan. Unless and until it is wiped out, however, ISIS-K will continue to exert ideological pressure on the Taliban, forcing it to accommodate the hardliners in its ranks or risk defections.

PS: Regardless of the terrorist threat, you lamented, the United States and its allies have “abandoned the people of Afghanistan, leaving them at the mercy of a brutal and repressive movement.” How should outside actors, beginning with the US, address the humanitarian fallout? Are there points of leverage that the international community can use to protect the rights of Afghans, especially vulnerable groups like minorities and women?

FG: The fear that terrorist groups could reemerge in Afghanistan should not distract analysts from the humanitarian catastrophe that is now unfolding. Left to their own devices, the Taliban cannot provide Afghans with basic goods and services, let alone social and political stability. They are not equipped – in terms of temperament, resources, or experience – to govern a war-ravaged country of almost 40 million people that is beset by economic and social crisis.

The West has a moral responsibility not to abandon Afghans. At last month’s G7 meeting, world leaders took a step in the right direction, agreeing to offer the Taliban a road map to recognition, based on conditional engagement. The goal is to moderate the Taliban’s conduct at home and protect the social gains of the last 20 years, especially in terms of female education and human rights. Such engagement would also aim to help the Taliban manage the thousands of militant foreign fighters in Afghanistan and prevent their presence from poisoning the country’s relations with its neighbors.

Success is far from guaranteed. But the alternative – abandoning Afghanistan – is not an option. This would create conditions that would benefit Islamist militants and terrorist groups, and further impoverish Afghanistan’s long-suffering people.

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PS: Last May, you noted that, when it comes to the US, Israel is “the tail that wags the dog.” This is a longstanding dynamic, reinforced by then-Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, who knew “all too well how to influence US politics, particularly when violent conflict erupts.” Might the Naftali Bennett-Yair Lapid government that has since replaced Netanyahu’s create an opening for US President Joe Biden to begin to address his “Israel problem”?

FG: The short answer is no. After all, when it comes to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, the Bennett-Lapid government is even more hawkish than Netanyahu’s coalition. Bennett, in particular, falls far to the right of Netanyahu on this topic. Given his domestic priorities and his retrenchment from the Middle East, I highly doubt that Biden will invest any real political capital in advancing the prospects of Israel-Palestinian peace. The “Israel problem” will thus remain for the foreseeable future.

PS: Last month, you wrote that America’s withdrawal from the Middle East, together with China’s increased engagements, gives regional powers an opportunity to “pursue diplomatic openings and new security arrangements” as they “recalibrate their foreign policies and restore relations with estranged neighbors.” How might a Taliban-led Afghanistan fit into the emerging regional order? What are the odds of an Iranian-Saudi rapprochement?

FG: The Taliban’s strategic victory in Afghanistan undermines America’s position in the Middle East and empowers Iran and its allies, particularly Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen. More broadly, it gives all political Islamists a major psychological boost. This will undoubtedly shape the strategic recalibration that is happening across the Middle East.

As for an Iranian-Saudi rapprochement, I wouldn’t hold my breath. Yes, they have engaged in secret talks in the past year. But diplomatic normalization and a productive bilateral relationship is probably a bridge too far. I do, however, expect more de-escalation, rather than a ratcheting up of tensions.

BY THE WAY . . .

PS: Your forthcoming book, The Hundred Years’ War for Control of the Middle East: From Sykes-Picot to the Deal of the Century, explores the past century of power struggles in the region. Why did you think this history needed to be re-examined and re-told now? Are there particular historical insights that could help to guide a peaceful reordering of regional politics?

FG: The agency of everyday people in the Middle East and North Africa is substantially shaped by three political dynamics: constant and intense foreign intervention in internal affairs, local trajectories of bad governance, and the international context of regional conflicts, such as the prolonged Israel-Palestine conflict. In order to understand the conditions of the contemporary Middle East – including why regional stability has reached its current nadir after 100 years of state- and nation-building – these are the factors we must be scrutinizing.

PS: What lessons should the US learn from its defeat in Afghanistan?

FG: As the most powerful country in the world, the US must resist the temptation to shoot first and ask questions later. This has been a recipe for disaster in Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, and beyond. American leaders must rid themselves of their crusading impulses and moral-superiority complex in international affairs – qualities that have done far more harm than good, including to the US. Instead, they should recognize the limits of hard power and show humility, prudence, and respect for other cultures.

This means that, rather than try to remake other countries in America’s image, the US – together with the broader international community – should invest in rebuilding failed institutions abroad, eradicating abject poverty, and combating extremism. American leaders must also bridge the divide between their rosy rhetoric about human rights and democracy and their actions, which are seen as hypocritical and self-serving in many parts of the world.

PS: The 2015 book Contentious Politics in the Middle East: Popular Resistance and Marginalized Activism beyond the Arab Uprisings, a collection of essays that you edited, examines popular agency during the Arab Spring uprisings, through the framework of social movement theory. What does this sociological analysis tell us about the Arab world?

FG: The Middle East, including the Arab world, will never be stable, prosperous, and harmonious unless the will and the agency of its peoples are taken seriously. Political authoritarianism, which is sustained partly by intense foreign intervention, has pauperized Middle Eastern societies and turned the region into an institutional wilderness. The key lesson is this: as long as people are oppressed and denied freedom and dignity, they will continue to revolt.

PS: You have conducted extensive field research in the Middle East. What advice would you give to young scholars interested in studying the region?

FG: Look at the region from within, not from without. Look at the region from the bottom up, not from the top down. Recognize that everyday people were struggling long before the Arab Spring uprisings of 2010-12, and that the suppression of those revolts in most countries will not end their struggles. And understand that political authoritarianism and conflict are not the Middle East’s destiny.

Gerges recommends

We ask all our Say More contributors to tell our readers about a few books that have impressed them recently. Here are Gerges's picks:

  • War and Peace

    War and Peace

    I just re-read this masterful chronicle of Russian life during the Napoleonic wars. “Kings are the slaves of history,” Tolstoy famously reminded us. In fact, history’s great protagonists – those who drive and shape it – are the ordinary people who are all too often overlooked. Nowhere is this truer than in the Middle East. Understanding ordinary people’s influence on events will open the door to more positive engagement, stability, and prosperity in the region and beyond.

  • After the Apocalypse: America’s Role in a World Transformed

    After the Apocalypse: America’s Role in a World Transformed

    This is a trenchant critique of US foreign policy and the ideology of American exceptionalism. Bacevich calls for the country to rethink its foreign-policy fundamentals, advocating a far more prudent approach that recognizes the limits of the use of military force in international affairs.

https://prosyn.org/900rSXi