Anders Åslund
Says More…
This week in Say More, PS talks with Anders Åslund, the author of Russia’s Crony Capitalism: The Path from Market Economy to Kleptocracy (Yale University Press, 2019).
Project Syndicate: What happens next in Ukraine will depend significantly on the outcome of this week’s US presidential election. A victory for Donald Trump – who has pledged to end the war in a day – would presumably give Ukraine no time to strengthen its position on the battlefield or continue draining Russian resources. In such a scenario, how might Ukraine and its partners leverage Russia’s economic weaknesses – which you note are “more severe than is commonly understood” – to bring an end to the war that does not involve “complete capitulation to the Kremlin”?
Anders Åslund: In the last two months, I have traveled to six European countries: Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, Sweden, and Ukraine. In all of them, the frightening possibility of a Trump victory – which would be disastrous for Ukraine and Europe – loomed large.
The Nordic and Baltic countries – which, united by shared fears and interests, increasingly operate as the “Nordic-Baltic Eight” – are ramping up their defense expenditures, redoubling their commitment to NATO, and seeking to provide as much support as possible to Ukraine. The Czech, Dutch, Polish, and Romanian governments take similar positions. While they might not say so publicly, owing to diplomatic considerations, all these countries desire nothing less than regime change in Russia.
The two important weak points in the West are Germany, which has a poor understanding of how to conduct foreign policy, and the United States, which is terrified by the thought of nuclear war. Unfortunately, these political weaklings have the most potent weapons. With Trump in the White House, matters would become much worse: his intention appears to be to strike a quick deal with Russia behind Ukraine’s back. The fact that Russia’s economy is operating essentially on borrowed time is just one reason why such a move would benefit Vladimir Putin above all.
And yet, there is a very good chance that such a “peace” initiative by Trump would fail to end the conflict. Most Ukrainians understand that any concession to Putin would be disastrous for them, and Ukraine’s many friends in Europe may well decide to defy Trump – who showed during his earlier presidency that he has no sense of loyalty to Europe – and step up their support for the Ukrainian resistance. With that, a sharp division would emerge between Trump’s US and the whole of Europe.
PS: A victory for Vice President Kamala Harris, by contrast, could enable Ukraine to “turn today’s horrendous war of attrition” into a military triumph, you write, if she adopts a “comprehensive strategy backed by sufficient resources.” You have dismissed three key considerations that have so far constrained such a strategy: Putin’s nuclear threats, the idea that seizing frozen Russian assets would undermine international law and the global financial system, and the “prohibition against using US-supplied weapons to hit Russian bases from which Ukraine is being attacked.” Is there a true “red line” that Harris must not cross, in order to avoid escalating the war or compounding the fallout?
AA: Harris has been deeply involved with Ukraine in her capacity as vice president, having met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky six times since the war started. She has also pledged that, as president, she would uphold support for Ukraine. But she has not put forward a clear policy strategy.
As president, Harris would have a critical opportunity to correct the shortcomings of Joe Biden’s approach. Rather than fearing some “red line” – which Putin has drawn precisely to avert the kinds of actions that would cause him to lose the war – Harris should take bold action. This means giving Ukraine permission to hit any and all Russia military targets, including the Kerch Strait bridge, which links Crimea to Russia. It also means delivering, together with Germany, enough long-range ballistic missiles – US-made Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missiles and German Taurus missiles – to enable Ukraine to succeed. Add to that an invitation for Ukraine to join NATO, and Harris could fundamentally change the balance in the war.
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PS: Putin’s war of aggression against Ukraine might have “already made history for both its cruelty and its stupidity,” you wrote last year, but it has also increased Putin’s “control of society” and has clearly benefited his cronies. What power shifts might we see in Russia after the Ukraine war ends, and is there an outcome in Ukraine that would pose a real threat to Putin’s position?
AA: For Putin – a dictator of Stalinesque proportions – a bad war might be better than a good peace. By fostering a sense of national purpose, war gives dictators license to repress their populations even more intensely than usual. But while this protects the dictator’s position to an extent, it also increases the regime’s fragility, not least because officials do not dare to take any initiative, let alone challenge their leader.
This fragility was on stark display last year, when longtime Putin crony Yevgeny Prigozhin led his Wagner Group mercenaries in a march on Moscow. Yes, Prigozhin died soon after, in a plane crash that one can only assume was no accident, but his march was not stopped by force, and his criticisms of the Russian military establishment were widely heard.
This past September, a deadly shootout took place just a few hundred yards from the Kremlin, as competing gangs fought over Wildberries, Russia’s alternative to Amazon, following a controversial merger deal that was reportedly approved by Putin. While arrests have been made, they undoubtedly reflect Putin’s personal preferences: in Russia, the rule of law applies only under Putin’s order.
Nonetheless, if Russia loses the war in Ukraine – if it does not get to steal or occupy any more Ukrainian territory – Putin could find himself in serious peril. Indeed, few dictators could survive such a humiliation.
BY THE WAY . . .
PS: Assuming Harris wins the election (or Trump decides to give Ukraine more time), what conditions must be met before Ukraine and its partners join Russia at the negotiating table, and which provisions are essential to safeguard Ukraine’s territorial integrity in the long term?
AA: I think this question is based on a flawed premise, as very few wars end with negotiations. Instead, they tend to end in capitulation (as in the case of Germany and Japan in World War II), revolutions (for example, in Russia in 1917 and in Germany in 1918), or stalemate (such as in Korea). So, a more useful question would be: How can the Ukraine war end?
Three possible scenarios stand out. One is a Russian victory, with Ukraine being forced to accept a humiliating – and temporary – peace. Since Putin takes issue with Ukraine’s very existence as an independent country, he can be expected, sooner or later, to start a new war.
In the second scenario, Ukraine defeats Russia, cutting off Crimea and forcing Russian forces to retreat. Given the threat this would pose to Putin’s position, it is clearly the most desirable outcome, and the West should do everything in its power to make it a reality. This is not up to the US alone: the European Union has all the resources it needs to enable Ukraine to triumph.
The third scenario is a continued stalemate in a war of attrition that has brought only minimal changes to the frontline since late 2022. This is the likely result if the US and Europe, especially Germany, continue to drip-feed weapons deliveries and limit Ukraine’s room for maneuver on the battlefield.
PS: In your recent book Reconstruction, Reform, and EU Accession for Ukraine, co-authored by Andrius Kubilius, you argue that Ukraine’s accession to the European Union is crucial to European security, Ukraine’s post-war reforms, and the EU’s revitalization. How well do existing frameworks, such as the EU’s Ukraine Facility, align with your vision, and what else should the EU be doing now to lay the groundwork for Ukraine’s rapid and successful accession?
AA: In June, the EU opened accession negotiations with Ukraine, and the process is proceeding with uncommon speed. The necessary EU administrative bodies have been established and are working effectively with the Ukrainian government. The European Commission has set up a special Ukrainian Service – comprising 100 professionals in Brussels and another 40 professionals at the EU’s embassy in Kyiv – to assess Ukraine’s starting point, before plans are put in place for Ukraine to meet the democratic, legal, and economic conditions for accession.
The next step is financing. The EU has allocated €50 billion ($55 billion) to Ukraine over four years through its Ukraine Facility. In addition, the European Parliament just approved a €35 billion loan for Ukraine, to be repaid with future revenues from the sovereign Russian assets that have been frozen in the West since the invasion. Ukraine is getting another $30 billion in Russian-asset-backed loans from the US ($20 billion), together with Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom ($10 billion).
All of these are steps in the right direction. What is still missing, Kubilius and I argue, is a strong executive – a Ukraine Reconstruction Agency – with bases in Brussels and Kyiv.
PS: Let’s say Trump does win the US presidency and capitulates to Russia in Ukraine. What risks would this raise beyond Ukraine? Are pessimists right that Putin would then set his sights on the Baltic states, or even Poland, jeopardizing the entire post-Cold War order in Europe?
AA: A second Trump presidency in the US would be disastrous on every level. In fact, Trump would effectively abandon the West. As he embraced values that are more closely aligned with those of China, Russia, and the Gulf dictatorships, he would become an enemy of Europe, the rule of law, and freedom. The first victim would be Ukraine, for all the reasons described above. The second victim would be NATO, which would lose all content.
We should not overestimate Russia’s military might, especially after years of fighting in Ukraine. But nor should we underestimate the profound threat Russia will pose to Europe if it gets what it wants in Ukraine. The Baltic and Nordic states, as well as countries like Poland and Romania, understand this. But Germany and France do not, and Hungary is on Putin’s side. The question, then, is how quickly and effectively Eastern and Northern European countries could arm themselves and stand up to Russia.
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