Before the recent European Parliament elections, polls and pundits were predicting that far-right groups would win a record number of seats, dealing a harsh blow to Europe’s mainstream political parties. But while far-right parties made gains, and Greens, social democrats, and liberals lost seats, Europe’s mainstream center-right faction, the European People’s Party, has maintained its dominance.

The “de facto (winningest) leader” of the EPP is Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, whose Civic Coalition (KO) achieved the “best performance of all major mainstream parties,” notes Sławomir Sierakowski, founder of Krytyka Polityczna. Tusk has been “uncompromising” in opposing “anti-democratic illiberalism” since he ousted the right-wing populist Law and Justice (PiS) party from power last fall, and KO’s success, argues Sierakowski, reflects a strategy that “made this election about the very fate of the European Union.”

Denmark also offers lessons for resisting the far right, points out Michael Ehrenreich, a former director of the Danish Foreign Policy Society. Since the far-right Danish People’s Party made major electoral gains a decade ago, the established political parties have successfully pushed it back to the margins, partly by adopting “elements of [its] policy positions, especially on immigration.” Still, “constant vigilance” is needed to keep the far right at bay.

That vigilance may have been lacking in France, where Marine Le Pen’s right-wing National Rally won twice as many votes as President Emmanuel Macron’s Renaissance party. In response, Macron immediately called a snap election. After being “unable to govern the country” since losing his parliamentary majority two years ago, observes Sciences Po’s Zaki Laïdi, Macron feels he has nothing to lose. “If National Rally does come to power,” it will merely give voters a “taste of what [the party] truly represents before the 2027 French presidential elections.”

Philippe Legrain, Visiting Senior Fellow at the London School of Economics’ European Institute, praises Macron’s decision to dissolve the National Assembly. Though “pro-EU parties will still command a majority in the next [European] Parliament,” and “far-right parties are deeply divided,” mainstream parties must not be complacent. “Calling the populists’ bluff,” as Macron is doing, “offers the best chance of victory” against the far right, “by showing how their radical policies could backfire.”

But the risks of a far-right victory should not be underestimated. In Slovakia, the Atlantic Council’s Soňa Muzikárová explains, a “toxic political climate and deepening polarization” contributed to the attempted assassination in May of Prime Minister Robert Fico, whose “anti-democratic government” is now attempting to “exploit the tragedy to suppress the opposition and independent media.” Even if the shooting bolsters popular support for Fico, “the opposition and the media must continue to scrutinize and challenge the ruling coalition.”

Slovakia is not an outlier. Contrary to what “most of the mainstream media” would have us believe, argues Slavoj Žižek of the Birkbeck Institute for the Humanities at the University of London, the election results show that “Europe really is moving to the radical right.” Instead of accommodating the far right by disregarding the “axiom of post-World War II European democracy, ‘No collaboration with fascists,’” mainstream parties and politicians must act “as forcefully and as fast as possible” to resist the “new fascism.”

WARSAW – The way to defeat the populist far right, it seems, is to oppose it tooth and nail. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk can attest to that. Since ousting Poland’s populist Law and Justice (PiS) party from power last fall, he has been uncompromising in opposing the anti-democratic illiberalism that it represents. And in the European Parliament election, his Civic Coalition (KO) had the best performance of all major mainstream parties in the EU, securing a surprising 37.1% of the vote.

To be sure, the result confirms the enduring strength of PiS’s populist base. Even with a low turnout in the countryside, the party can count on a minimum of 30% support. Tusk succeeded not because PiS has grown substantially weaker, but because he made this election about the very fate of the European Union. He framed it as a contest between his coalition and all parties – not just PiS – that oppose the EU.

Within Poland, KO’s victory should improve the chances of its likely presidential candidate, Warsaw Mayor Rafał Trzaskowski, in next year’s election. A Trzaskowski victory over the incumbent, PiS stalwart Andrzej Duda, is crucial to reversing the damage done after PiS’s near decade in power.

KO’s success has implications for all of Europe. Following the defeat of French President Emmanuel Macron’s Renaissance party, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s coalition, and Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez’s Socialists, Poland’s influence as a representative of the European center has grown significantly. Tusk is now the de facto (winningest) leader of the largest faction in the European People’s Party (EPP), the pan-European grouping of mainstream conservatives and centrists that won the most seats overall.

But this is not to suggest that Tusk’s victory was exceptional. For all the fears of a far-right wave, there was no Europe-wide illiberal revolution. The same centrist parties that have controlled the European Parliament for many years retained a safe majority of 453 seats (out of 720). Though populists won in France (spectacularly), Italy, and Austria, they will not hold enough seats to reverse or fundamentally change EU policy. Moreover, the far right is itself divided between several factions.

In Germany, the Greens and the Free Democrats have been weakened, but the center-right Christian Democrats remain strong within the EPP. And since a majority coalition is unlikely – if not impossible – without the EPP’s participation, Ursula von der Leyen’s position as president of the European Commission is probably safe. Operating from the center, she will be able to build different coalitions to address controversial issues – for example, by relying on the right on immigration, and on the left with respect to green policy.

The biggest concern for Europe now lies in France, which can export chaos to the rest of the EU. Marine Le Pen’s far-right National Rally beat Macron’s party by a two-to-one margin. Macron will now face three years of paralysis and dysfunction before the next French presidential election, which will further increase the likelihood of a Le Pen victory. Macron has already responded by announcing a snap parliamentary election. While Le Pen’s favored candidates are almost certain to win the largest share of support in many first-round votes, the second round is what matters.

One big problem for Macron is that he is now the far left’s bête noire. Unlike in the past, there is no guarantee that a majority of French voters will unite against far-right candidates in the second round. The Macronists thus have already signaled that they will not field their own candidate in races where a candidate representing the broader left stands a good chance of beating Le Pen’s candidate. They also will be betting on the assumption that voters tend to behave more “irresponsibly” in European elections (where the stakes are seen to be lower) than they do in national elections.

If Le Pen does win a majority in the French parliament, Macron will be stuck with a hostile cohabitation arrangement. Though he will still represent France at the European Council, Le Pen’s allies may represent the country at various sectoral councils (such as summits of foreign ministers). These changes would not yet alter France’s overall position in the EU, however, because many decisions require a majority, not unanimity; Le Pen’s ministers may simply end up on the losing side of the vote. Moreover, Le Pen is unlikely to challenge von der Leyen’s re-election.

For his part, Macron seems to have judged that a Le Pen victory in the snap election is worth the risk. Giving her party control over parliament – and thus a responsibility to demonstrate leadership, rather than merely sniping from the opposition seats – could well bleed it of support over the next three years. And if Le Pen fails to win a majority, the task of forming a new government will return to Macron, who could still form a minority government with tacit parliamentary backing. In this scenario, Macron would have many opportunities to rebuild his support in the coming years, because the French system affords the president far-reaching powers, including the authority to pass a budget by decree.

In sum, while the far right is celebrating for now, this was no illiberal sea change. Once again, Tusk has shown that right-wing populists can be beaten back.

COPENHAGEN – Unlike in other countries, the far right in Denmark did not dominate this month’s European elections. Although populism surged in the country a decade ago, the parties at the center have pushed the far right to the fringes and are now back in control.

In the 2014 European Parliament election, the far-right Danish People’s Party shocked the political establishment by winning the largest number of seats, with the party’s main candidate setting a national record for personal votes received. Then, the DPP triumphed in the general election one year later, to become the largest party in the conservative bloc, and the second-largest party in parliament. But in the European elections this month, the Danish far right was left scrambling to hold on to just one seat. What happened?

Since the shock of 2014, the established political parties, led by the Social Democrats and the current prime minister, Mette Frederiksen, have adopted elements of the far right’s policy positions, especially on immigration, which is generally seen as the main driving force behind the rise of populism. Whereas Denmark once had among the most liberal immigration regimes in Europe, it has gradually tightened its policy and introduced stricter requirements for those seeking Danish citizenship.

Another factor in recent populist waves is the deterioration of living conditions outside the big cities, where jobs and opportunities have been disappearing throughout the globalization era. To address this problem, successive Danish governments have shifted public funds away from the cities – especially the capital, Copenhagen – to shore up social mobility in small-town Denmark.

Meanwhile, the run-up to the recent European Parliament election demonstrated that the far right has fallen out of sync with an overwhelming majority of Danish voters on two key issues: climate change and security policy. In addition to challenging the European Union’s authority to act against climate change, far-right politicians have even announced their intention to withdraw from key climate agreements at the national level. Yet poll after poll has shown that Danish voters demand aggressive policies to combat climate change.

Likewise, on security policy, the far right questioned the EU’s legitimacy as a forum for collective action, and argued that Danish security policy should be decided solely under the auspices of NATO. Yet in light of Russia’s war on Ukraine, Danish voters strongly disagree.

While the Danish far right has always been skeptical of the EU, the DPP did not follow other right-wing nationalist parties in moderating its position in the years following Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic. Instead, it doubled down and called for Denmark to leave the EU altogether. While that move consolidated the party’s electoral base, it radically reduced its chances of regaining its earlier strength. Danish support for EU membership has grown, and, in 2022, a referendum even scrapped a longstanding opt-out on defense cooperation.

These sentiments should not come as a surprise. Danish television viewers watched in horror as the British House of Commons descended into chaos in the wake of Brexit. Britain’s political turmoil and economic sclerosis have convinced many Danes not to pursue a similar path. Similarly, Russia’s war of aggression has underscored the importance of EU membership and joint policymaking. Denmark is a strong supporter of not only Ukraine but also the Baltic countries, any one of which could be next in line.

But while the far right has been pushed to the margins of Danish politics – owing to its hardened hostility toward the EU and the center’s neutralization of immigration as an issue – the threat of populism is still alive. The far right has splintered, and – contrary to what one might assume – this development is not necessarily beneficial for the political center. The breakaways, under the banner of the Denmark Democrats party, made a strong showing in the 2022 general election, and have secured one seat in the European Parliament.

While the new party is closer to the center and more supportive of EU membership, it has managed to keep immigration on the agenda. Sensing the risks, the Social Democrats’ spokesman on immigration, Frederik Vad, recently warned foreigners in the country against engaging in subversive activities, implying that non-native residents are not generally well integrated into Danish society. By shifting the issue from levels of immigration to the supposed challenges of integration, Vad, who is backed by the prime minister and other established parties, echoed what the far right has been claiming for years.

Although Vad’s statement drew heavy criticism, even from many Social Democrats, it demonstrates the extent to which the populist threat still influences political leaders in the center. They remain convinced that the Danish model for keeping the far right at bay requires constant vigilance.

PARIS – Contrary to expectations, the European elections this month did not bring major political changes to the continent. The political balance within the European Parliament remains more or less stable, notwithstanding a slight increase in seats held by the far right and, above all, by independents.

While fears of a far-right wave were overblown, the big exception is France, where President Emmanuel Macron’s Renaissance party won only 14.6% of the vote, compared to 31.4% for Marine Le Pen’s right-wing National Rally. Macron immediately responded with the shocking announcement that he is dissolving the National Assembly and calling a snap election.

Although the French constitution permits Macron to dissolve parliament if he determines that he no longer has a political mandate, French presidents have rarely taken this step. The only comparable precedent is Jacques Chirac’s 1997 decision to dissolve parliament, and that backfired spectacularly. Thus, Macron’s gambit is highly significant.

Why did he do it? From one point of view, his decision was perfectly logical, given that he has struggled to secure a stable parliamentary majority ever since the 2022 election. For two years, he has tried to create a coalition at the National Assembly by reaching an arrangement with the traditional right. But these efforts have been unsuccessful.

Coalitions are the rule in many European countries, but not in France. This is largely owing to the two-round voting system, which tends toward bipolarity, even though the broader political realm is tri-polar or even quadrupolar (extreme right, right, center, and left). To come to power in the French system, you need to broaden your base to win at the second round. As long as National Rally was perceived as an extremist party, this was easily done. That is how Macron secured his victories in the 2017 and 2022 elections.

But over the past 20 years, National Rally (previously the National Front) has gradually grown at the expense of the traditional right, breaking through the ceiling that once limited its influence. And in the European elections, it came out on top in almost every voting district, with support in the 30-40% range in many cases. No longer can the party simply be bypassed by appealing to the center left and right.

Moreover, Macron’s own support has fallen in recent years, partly because of his policy positions, but largely because of his authoritarian personality, arrogance, and apparent inability to listen even to his own camp. He is brilliant, but unbearably so, especially in the eyes of the working class.

By surprising everyone with a snap election, Macron is hoping to shock the electorate out of its complacency about the far right and catch his opponents off guard. National Rally certainly did not expect such a quick decision, and nor did the conservative Republicans. Le Pen’s party will need to win 201 additional seats to secure an absolute majority.

To avert that outcome, Macron must attract some share of voters from the traditional right and left. But this is going to be an uphill battle. Renaissance is not terribly attractive to these constituencies.

Moreover, there is a huge risk that, in the second round, it will be squeezed between National Rally and the left, both of which decided to present one unique candidate in each district. To reach the second round, a candidate needs to secure at least 12.5% of registered voters, which means at least 20% of the votes (after accounting for abstentions). Given that Macron’s party secured only 14.6% of the votes on Sunday, it is easy to see how it could be toppled as the primary political force in the country.

Indeed, it is already looking like Macron’s own party, which was never consulted, will lose at least 100 seats to either the Republicans or to the left. A rebellion within the ranks of Renaissance thus cannot be ruled out. Former Prime Minister Édouard Philippe, who aspires to succeed Macron, and who is upset by his decision to call an election, will try to take the lead. He is now in open conflict with Macron, and refuses to let the president run the show. Philippe does not want to pay the political price for Macron’s mistakes.

The elections most likely will result in a victory for National Rally, reaffirming the results from the European elections. Even if Le Pen cannot secure an absolute majority, she may form an alliance with some segment of the traditional right or various independents. The traditional right is already on the verge of an explosion. The right-wing faction of the Republicans is calling for an alliance with National Rally, while the rest of the party is upset by that choice. The French political scene is on the verge of chaos, and apart from National Rally, all forces are in serious trouble.

Macron has been unable to govern the country for two years, and his legitimacy has been considerably eroded. Feeling like he has nothing to lose, he is going “all in” with his current hand, as they say in poker. As in the past, he is confident that his personal involvement will allow him to regain lost ground. He has always had a very personalized vision of French politics, which he sees as organized wholly around himself.

Moreover, Macron is betting that if National Rally does come to power, voters will get a taste of what it truly represents before the 2027 French presidential elections. Burdened with the actual responsibilities of governance, the party will no longer enjoy the benefits of political virginity. Macron wants to do to National Rally what François Mitterrand did to the right in 1986. If Le Pen’s bid for the presidency in 2027 fails, Macron can leave power with no regrets, claiming that he has done France a service. If he fails, his already damaged legacy will suffer another massive blow.

LONDON – Far-right populist parties performed exceptionally well in the European Parliament elections, finishing first in France, Italy, and three other countries. They won nearly a quarter of the seats in the Parliament, just behind the center right.

With Europe already reeling from the war in Ukraine, the threat of a second Donald Trump presidency in the United States, stagnant living standards, strained welfare systems, and extreme weather events, nationalists pose a severe threat. These parties are often sympathetic to Russian President Vladimir Putin and downright hostile to green policies, migrants, and European Union institutions.

Mainstream pro-European parties have three broad options for responding: complacency, co-optation, or counterattack. Let’s start with the case for business as usual. Many Europeans believe – incorrectly – that EU elections are inconsequential. Turnout is much lower than in national elections, and many people cast protest votes, often against governing parties.

Even so, pro-EU parties will still command a majority in the next Parliament. The center-right European People’s Party (EPP), led by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, actually gained seats.

Moreover, far-right parties are deeply divided. They are split between two rival parliamentary groups, and some are unattached. They disagree on the Ukraine war, economic policy, LGBTQ rights, and, crucially, whether to work within the EU system or against it. Inevitably, such rifts dilute their influence.

But complacency is dangerous. The center held only because it is defined ever more broadly, encompassing not only the EPP and the Socialists and Democrats (S&D), but also the classical and social liberals of Renew Europe and the Greens. Von der Leyen seemingly has enough votes in Parliament to be re-elected as Commission president – but only just. And anything can happen in a secret ballot. This hardly suggests a strong and stable pro-EU center, especially because the EPP gained ground partly by campaigning against the bloc’s green agenda.

More worryingly, the elections reordered the political landscape in key member states. Despite neo-Nazi tendencies and questionable ties to Russia and China, the extremist Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) finished second in Germany, ahead of Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s Social Democrats (SPD). In France, National Rally won 32% of the vote, more than double that of President Emmanuel Macron’s centrist allies – a crushing defeat that led Macron to call a snap election. Europe’s two most powerful leaders are thus severely weakened, leaving the bloc potentially rudderless in the face of immense economic, security, and climate challenges.

The second option, then, is to accommodate the far right, a common outcome at the national level. Many center-right parties adopt the far right’s language and policies, notably on migration (as do some center-left ones). In several member states, they even govern together.

At the EU level, pragmatists argue that some far-right parties can be brought into the conservative mainstream. Witness von der Leyen’s wooing of Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, who has fashioned herself as a traditional conservative, despite the neo-fascist roots of her Brothers of Italy (FdI) party, and raised her profile by working with, rather than against, EU institutions. (This is an old trick: after a showdown with EU authorities that almost led to Greece’s ejection from the eurozone in 2015, its hard-left Syriza government was eventually enticed into the pro-EU camp.)

The risk is that the far right co-opts the center right, rather than vice versa. Consider how the EU’s approach to asylum-seekers has shifted from then-German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s welcoming policy in 2015 to near-universal hostility now. Moreover, far-right parties can gain strength as their views become normalized, as evidenced by the victory of Geert Wilders’s Party for Freedom (PVV) in last year’s Dutch general election.

Above all, embracing the far right can backfire spectacularly. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party, for example, once sat in the EPP; now he is a pro-Putin renegade who treats the rule of law and democratic rights with contempt. And while Meloni may be palatable to some centrists, no one seems eager to work with France’s National Rally, much less Germany’s AfD.

That leaves the third option: fight the far right. Macron has opted to pursue this course by calling a snap legislative election. This is widely viewed as a high-stakes gamble, given Macron’s unpopularity and the electorate’s hostile mood. France could conceivably elect a far-right prime minister in a run-off vote next month. In that case, Macron would become a lame duck for his remaining three years in office.

But his position was severely weakened in any case, and his governing coalition, which lacks a parliamentary majority, was at risk of losing a no-confidence vote. By dissolving the National Assembly, Macron has regained the initiative, creating two possible paths for defeating the far right.

For one, the campaign may focus voters’ attention on the far-right threat, which could help Macron cobble together a parliamentary majority comprising left and right parties united in their desire to keep the National Rally at bay. Given Macron’s unpopularity, this seems somewhat unlikely.

More plausibly, Macron could set up the far right to fail. Populists tend to perform best when they are outsiders challenging established parties, not wielding responsibility. Observe how Conservatives in the United Kingdom, having delivered on their Brexit promise, have been skewered by the reality of it, while the popularity of Wilders’ PVV has already dipped now that it is in government.

If the National Rally wins a majority, or ends up leading a broader right-wing coalition, it would likely struggle with the harsh responsibilities of governing – such as difficult fiscal decisions, and whether and how to cooperate with EU institutions. Moderating its hardline policies could erode its anti-establishment edge; enacting them could plunge the country into crisis. Either way, this could undermine the popularity of its leader, Marine Le Pen, ahead of her likely presidential run. Better a far-right prime minister in 2024 than a far-right president in 2027.

BRATISLAVA – Just as Slovakia entered a moratorium on public speeches and campaigning ahead of this month’s European Parliament elections, Prime Minister Robert Fico delivered his first public remarks since he was seriously injured in an assassination attempt in May.

On May 15, Fico was shot four times at close range in the former mining town of Handlová in central Slovakia after chairing an offsite cabinet meeting. He was transported to the hospital in critical condition, underwent several surgeries, and is now recuperating at his home in Bratislava.

In a recorded video address, Fico said he “forgives” the man who tried to kill him. But he swiftly blamed the “politically unsuccessful and frustrated” opposition for the circumstances that led to the shooting, calling the assailant the opposition’s “messenger of evil and political hatred,” adding that he has “no reason to believe this was an attack by a lone madman.”

The shooter, Juraj Cintula – a 71-year-old poet and former security guard – reportedly opposed Fico’s media policies and his government’s stance on Ukraine. But as an anti-minority, anti-immigrant activist with ties to an ultra-nationalist group that has acted as a pro-Russia propaganda tool, Cintula could hardly be described as a supporter of the progressive liberal opposition, let alone its “messenger.”

Nevertheless, the attempted assassination is indicative of Slovakia’s toxic political climate and deepening polarization (among the highest in Europe), which reflects three main factors. First, an intense intergenerational conflict is playing out across Slovakia’s political spectrum as older, rural, and often disillusioned voters find themselves at odds with the opposition’s younger, urban, and more pro-Western voter base.

These groups increasingly struggle to find common ground, causing rifts within households and local communities. For example, while the current government’s supporters are preoccupied with pensions, social benefits, and “preserving peace” – having been convinced by Fico that aiding Ukraine would drag Slovakia into a military conflict with Russia – younger voters view the country’s NATO and EU memberships as crucial security guarantees. Meanwhile, social conservatives, viewing “progressive” or “liberal” politics a threat to traditional family and religious values, assume a defensive stance that stifles constructive political dialogue.

Second, Slovakian voters have been inundated with incendiary rhetoric, misinformation, and hate speech, all amplified by social media. Fico himself has repeatedly – and falsely – accused former President Zuzana Čaputová of being a “foreign agent” serving “American interests,” possibly contributing to death threats against her and her loved ones. His cabinet members similarly mischaracterized pro-Western presidential candidate Ivan Korčok as a “warmonger” to stoke fears among supporters of the ruling party, Smer-Social Democracy.

Lastly, Fico’s return to power has exacerbated the problem. Fico, Slovakia’s longest-serving prime minister, staged an unlikely political comeback in 2023, five years after he was forced to step down to quell a political crisis sparked by the murder of a journalist investigating allegations of high-level corruption. Over the past few years, several members of Fico’s former cabinet have been suspected of, and in some cases charged with, serious criminal offenses.

Consequently, the government dismantled the Special Prosecutor’s Office – responsible for investigating such crimes – and tried to overhaul the penal code immediately after assuming office, triggering widespread protests. The government has also sought to restructure public media to tighten control over news content, thereby undermining press freedom and the European Union’s rule-of-law standards.

The outcome of April’s presidential election could further undermine democratic checks and balances, as the government-aligned president, Peter Pellegrini, is unlikely to challenge the executive branch, as Čaputová has done. Notably, the president is responsible for appointing constitutional court judges and has the authority to pardon convicted criminals. With Pellegrini’s victory, the administration’s control of the legislative and executive branches may extend to the presidency.

Any hope that Fico’s shooting would serve as a wake-up call and unite Slovaks in support of their fledgling democracy has been dashed. Shortly after the assassination attempt, several senior government officials suggested that the media played a role in radicalizing the prime minister’s shooter, telling journalists to “look in the mirror.” Fico’s address has made it abundantly clear that the government intends to use this tragedy to suppress the opposition and independent media, enabling it to pass controversial laws with little pushback.

Fico’s shooting could also fuel political violence across Europe and beyond, as populists around the world push for peace in Ukraine at the expense of Ukraine’s territorial integrity. In the days following the assassination attempt, Michal Šimečka, the leader of Slovakia’s main pro-democracy opposition party, and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk both received death threats.

But while Fico appears emboldened, the government might be overestimating how long it can maintain its current policy course, given Slovakia’s heavy reliance on its trading partners, allies, and international investors. The looming threat of losing crucial EU funds could constrain the government’s illiberal reforms, especially as Slovakia faces increased pressure from soaring energy prices and the EU’s reformed Stability and Growth Pact, with its rigid debt-reduction targets.

Moreover, Slovakia’s shift from legacy car manufacturing to electric vehicles will demand fresh inflows of foreign capital. But the ongoing political turbulence has diminished the economy’s international appeal and undermined its fiscal prospects, driving young Slovaks to seek opportunities abroad.

Even if Fico’s shooting bolsters his political support, the opposition and the media must continue to scrutinize and challenge the ruling coalition. Amid a recent spate of government bills aimed at eroding Slovakia’s remaining democratic safeguards, sustained international pressure is more important than ever.

LJUBLJANA – The surprise in this month’s European Parliament elections was that the outcome everyone expected really did come to pass. To paraphrase a classic scene from the Marx Brothers: Europe may be talking and acting like it is moving to the radical right, but don’t let that fool you; Europe really is moving to the radical right.

Why should we insist on this interpretation? Because most of the mainstream media has sought to downplay it. The message we keep hearing is: “Sure, Marine Le Pen, Giorgia Meloni, and Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) occasionally flirt with fascist motifs, but there is no reason to panic, because they still respect democratic rules and institutions once in power.” Yet this domestication of the radical right should trouble us all, because it signals a readiness by traditional conservative parties to go along with the new movement. The axiom of post-World War II European democracy, “No collaboration with fascists,” has been quietly abandoned.

The message of this election is clear. The political divide in most EU countries is no longer between the moderate right and the moderate left, but between the conventional right, embodied by the big winner, the European People’s Party (comprising Christian democrats, liberal-conservatives, and traditional conservatives) and the neo-fascist right represented by Le Pen, Meloni, AfD, and others.

The question now is whether the EPP will collaborate with neo-fascists. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen is spinning the outcome as a triumph of the EPP against both “extremes,” yet the new parliament will include no left-wing parties whose extremism is even distantly comparable to that of the far right. Such a “balanced” view from the EU’s top official sends an ominous signal.

When we talk about fascism today, we should not confine ourselves to the developed West. A similar kind of politics has been ascendant in much of the Global South as well. In his study of China’s development, the Italian Marxist historian Domenico Losurdo (also known for his rehabilitation of Stalin) stresses the distinction between economic and political power. In pursuing his “reforms,” Deng Xiaoping knew that elements of capitalism are necessary to unleash a society’s productive forces; but he insisted that political power should remain firmly in the hands of the Communist Party of China (as the self-proclaimed representative of the workers and farmers).

This approach has deep historical roots. For over a century, China has embraced the “pan-Asianism” that emerged toward the end of the nineteenth century as a reaction against Western imperialist domination and exploitation. As historian Viren Murthy explains, this project has always been driven by a rejection not of Western capitalism, but of Western liberal individualism and imperialism. By drawing on pre-modern traditions and institutions, pan-Asianists argued, Asian societies could organize their own modernization to achieve even greater dynamism than the West.

While Hegel himself saw Asia as a domain of rigid order that does not allow for individualism (free subjectivity), pan-Asianists proposed a new Hegelian conceptual framework. Since the freedom offered by Western individualism ultimately negates order and leads to social disintegration, they argued, the only way to preserve freedom is to channel it into a new collective agency.

One early example of this model can be found in Japan’s militarization and colonialist expansion before WWII. But historical lessons are soon forgotten. In the search for solutions to big problems, many in the West could be newly attracted to the Asian model of subsuming individualistic drives and the longing for meaning in a collective project.

Pan-Asianism tended to oscillate between its socialist and fascist versions (with the line between the two not always clear), reminding us that “anti-imperialism” is not as innocent as it may appear. In the first half of the twentieth century, Japanese and German fascists regularly presented themselves as defenders against American, British, and French imperialism, and one now finds far-right nationalist politicians taking similar positions vis-à-vis the European Union.

The same tendency is discernible in post-Deng China, which political scientist A. James Gregor classifies as “a variant of contemporary fascism”: a capitalist economy controlled and regulated by an authoritarian state whose legitimacy is framed in the terms of ethnic tradition and national heritage. That is why Chinese President Xi Jinping makes a point of referring to China’s long, continuous history stretching back to antiquity. Harnessing economic impulses for the sake of nationalistic projects is the very definition of fascism, and similar political dynamics can also be found in India, Russia, Turkey, and other countries.

It is not hard to see why this model has gained traction. While the Soviet Union suffered a chaotic disintegration, the CPC pursued economic liberalization but still maintained tight control. Thus, leftists who are sympathetic toward China praise it for keeping capital subordinated, in contrast to the US and European systems, where capital reigns supreme.

But the new fascism is also supported by more recent trends. Beyond Le Pen, another big winner of the European elections is Fidias Panayiotou, a Cypriot YouTube personality who previously gained attention for his efforts to hug Elon Musk. While waiting outside Twitter’s headquarters for his target, he encouraged his followers to “spam” Musk’s mother with his request. Eventually, Musk did meet and hug Panayiotou, who went on to announce his candidacy to the European Parliament. Running on an anti-partisan platform, he won 19.4% of the popular vote and secured himself a seat.

Similar figures have also cropped up in France, the United Kingdom, Slovenia, and elsewhere, all justifying their candidacies with the “leftist” argument that since democratic politics has become a joke, clowns might as well run for office. This is a dangerous game. If enough people despair of emancipatory politics and accept the withdrawal into buffoonery, the political space for neo-fascism widens.

Reclaiming that space requires serious, authentic action. For all my disagreements with French President Emmanuel Macron, I think he was correct to respond to the French far right’s victory by dissolving the National Assembly and calling for new legislative elections. His announcement caught almost everyone off guard, and it is certainly risky. But it is a risk worth taking. Even if Le Pen wins and decides who will be the next prime minister, Macron, as president, will retain the ability to mobilize a new majority against the government. We must take the fight to the new fascism as forcefully and as fast as possible.