Although multilateral efforts to address climate change are not well served by deepening geopolitical rivalries or the apparent trend toward global economic fragmentation, that doesn’t mean governments have abandoned the pursuit of net-zero emissions. Instead, the process has become more competitive – and more complex.
Since founding the Eurasia Group, a geopolitical risk advisory firm, more than 25 years ago, political scientist Ian Bremmer has had the ears of political and business leaders around the world, as well as a front-row seat at major multilateral policy conferences. As the author, most recently, of The Power of Crisis: How Three Threats – and Our Response – Will Change the World, he discusses the complexities of pursuing international cooperation and decarbonization in an age of superpower rivalries, geopolitical realignment, and new zero-sum security concerns.
Project Syndicate: In June, the European Union joined the Biden administration in imposing new tariffs on Chinese-made electric vehicles (EVs), citing what it sees as China’s unfair use of subsidies. After long pushing others to forego fossil fuels and pursue cleaner forms of economic development, are the Americans and Europeans losing credibility on this issue – and does that matter?
Ian Bremmer: Tariffs on Chinese EVs are less about losing climate credibility and more about addressing overreliance, competitiveness, and security issues in a chaotic geopolitical landscape. The US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the EU Green Deal are significant steps forward on climate policy, showing a commitment to green energy from both the Americans and Europeans.
Concerns over China’s overcapacity and state subsidies have been mounting, with G7 finance ministers actively seeking to counter China’s non-market policies. The EU is particularly worried about Beijing’s subsidies undermining EU competitiveness in key green and digital sectors. Even Canada is contemplating similar tariffs.
And I expect more to come. There will be further EU efforts to engage China on market access and overcapacity, and where negotiations fail, trade investigations will follow. China won’t quietly back down, though. It has launched anti-dumping probes into European products such as brandy and pork, and it may target automobiles next. This tit-for-tat dispute signals a deterioration in EU-China trade relations, with the EU set to intensify its economic de-risking strategy toward China in the coming years.
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PS: Being especially vulnerable to climate change, low- and middle-income countries across the Global South are open to receiving financial, technical, and other forms of support from wherever they can get it. With China increasingly presenting itself as an attractive option for them, are America and its allies squandering an opportunity here?
IB: At this point, developing economies are open to climate finance support from any quarter. With simultaneous major geopolitical conflicts, inflationary pressures, and pivotal elections happening this year, America and its allies view climate partnerships with emerging markets as a lower priority. The EU’s top priority is Ukraine, and the US has been consumed with the Gaza conflict.
In this context, the Global South will strengthen ties with China and Middle Eastern countries, as we’ve seen happening since the last United Nations Climate Change Conference in Dubai (COP28). Diversifying partnerships makes sense for these governments, since wealthy countries have made it clear they won’t significantly ramp up support anytime soon. Although climate finance will be a major topic at COP29 in Azerbaijan this year, the $1 trillion target will go unmet, leading to frustration and even more collaboration with non-traditional partners.
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The donor pool is becoming a contentious topic in UN climate negotiations, because countries like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, South Korea, and China are not currently classified as “developed economies” under official guidelines. The United States and some EU governments are pushing to expand this list to achieve more ambitious goals; but it won’t happen. Many emerging markets support the current list because they don’t want to antagonize China, which firmly opposes being a donor and criticizes developed markets for not delivering on climate finance.
PS: After participating in a Sino-American “track-two dialogue” in Beijing earlier this year, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., expressed confidence that cooperation between the two rival powers is still possible on climate change, among other issues. Do you agree with that, or do the strategic and “national-security” considerations surrounding climate policy and green technologies ensure a zero-sum dynamic?
IB: Cooperation between the US and China on climate change is not only possible but essential. This collaboration has historically set global policy expectations, laying the groundwork for milestones like the Paris climate agreement, COP26 (Glasgow), and COP28. The outcome of the US election will be crucial, but under a Democratic administration, robust climate cooperation could continue, particularly with the right climate envoys.
During the first three years of Joe Biden’s presidency, US Climate Envoy John Kerry (who stepped down earlier this year) and his Chinese counterpart, Xie Zhenhua, demonstrated that meaningful progress can still be made despite broader tensions. After the suspension of climate talks following US Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in 2022, Kerry and Xie’s teams were among the first to resume discussions in 2023.
Of course, future envoys will need to be fully committed to building on these efforts. And even then, separating climate issues from US-China tensions will pose a challenge. Chinese officials have stressed that climate collaboration requires “overall stable relations.”
The Transatlantic Political Climate
PS: US climate policies have also created tensions within the transatlantic world, with French President Emmanuel Macronarguing in December 2022 that the IRA risked “fragmenting the West.” Was that warning overblown, or should we expect the new industrial policies to remain a perennial source of conflict among Western allies even under another Democratic administration?
IB: Macron’s warning about the IRA was political rhetoric. The EU responded with its own green-tech initiative, the European Sovereignty Fund, but failed to agree on how to fund it. Other EU members, like Germany, argued that sufficient resources were already available and underused. If the IRA had posed such a serious threat, the EU would have collectively addressed it more effectively.
PS: What about under a second Trump presidency? How much damage could he do to the net-zero transition, both in the US and globally?
IB: DonaldTrump is obviously no fan of climate policies, but he supports US industry. His administration would cut IRA spending, and could do so significantly with full Republican support. These cuts would then ripple through the economy. But despite potential reductions in the IRA, the US would still pursue aggressive industrial policies, challenging economic trade partners. A Trump administration would favor oil and gas, but its impact would be limited. He could open new areas for federal leasing, but because most additional new production is occurring on private land, the effect on overall output would be marginal.
On the international front, a Trump comeback would be a big deal. You could expect a US withdrawal from UN climate talks altogether, which could derail progress at COP30 and significantly reduce funding for developing economies. This could weaken new climate commitments from all governments by 2025, eventually pushing global temperatures higher than currently projected.
PS: Following the strong performance by far-right parties in the European Parliament elections, should we expect Europe’s ambitions under the 2020 EU Green Deal to be scaled back? Even if EU leaders can develop plans to integrate the push for renewable energy fully into the bloc’s defense agenda, will the new political environment let them follow through?
IB: The EU has temporarily peaked in its adoption of environmental policies. Looking ahead, the bloc will largely focus on implementing existing regulations. Key among these is the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive, which will require companies to ramp up disclosures starting next year, with France already imposing strict penalties for noncompliance.
Similarly, the EU Deforestation Regulation will take effect this December, and countries around the world are already preparing for it. Seven key commodities will be barred from the EU market if their sourcing involves any kind of deforestation, legal or illegal.
Meanwhile, the recently adopted Nature Restoration Law – the EU’s flagship biodiversity legislation – requires that member states create action plans and set targets to increase their conservation and restoration efforts. The enforcement of these policies will lead to “transition risks.” Multinational corporations and governments that fail to comply with sustainability-related regulations will face legal action.
Modi-carbonization?
PS: Another elephant in the room is India. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has set highly ambitious decarbonization targets (including reaching net-zero by 2070), but India has also been hoovering up Russian hydrocarbons at a discount and increasing its consumption of coal to support its economic development. Is aggressive decarbonization really compatible with the country’s evolving strategic priorities?
IB: Actually, India’s net-zero target by 2070 is perceived by many as insufficiently ambitious. Several countries and multilateral organizations had advocated for earlier targets. But India faces a tough balancing act between long-term decarbonization and immediate economic priorities. It still relies on coal for domestic security and is being cautious about phasing it out until renewable-energy capacity and alternative revenue sources for coal-producing regions are well established.
Initially, India planned to shift its heavy industries from coal to liquid natural gas, and then to LNG with carbon capture, utilization, and storage or green hydrogen, while emphasizing solar power for homes. But energy-storage limitations, fluctuating LNG prices, and other challenges have prompted a shift toward a combination of LNG and green hydrogen for industry, and a mix of solar and nuclear power for residential areas.
Owing to capital shortages, grid instability, minimal storage solutions, and reliance on emerging technologies, India will not meet its 2030 targets of 500 gigawatts of non-fossil fuel power capacity and a 45% reduction in carbon intensity from 2005 levels. It is, however, expected to build its clean-energy supply chains by 2030 (leveraging a second-mover advantage), and this should help to accelerate its energy transition.
EVs are one bright spot. India has implemented tariffs to protect its budding domestic EV sector, and earlier this year it introduced a new policy to encourage EV manufacturing. This could attract investments worth billions of dollars from companies like Tesla or various Japanese firms.
Managing Expectations
PS: In the past, you’ve called attention to the political hurdles facing multilateral action on climate change, while also proposing new bodies such as a World Carbon Organization (following the model of the World Trade Organization). Where does your thinking stand today? In a world increasingly dominated by zero-sum strategic considerations, is it still realistic to put stock in ambitious multilateral solutions?
IB: Multilateral institutions will continue to face challenges, but they remain essential in an increasingly fragmented world. Their value lies in reaching global consensus and driving coordinated action, as seen with the Paris agreement’s impact on countries, companies, and communities. In that case, there was a clear “before and after.”
Yes, progress has been too slow, and these platforms need reform to fulfill their mandates. But to be fair, expectations for these negotiations are often too high, setting them up for failure. International fora should be seen as what they are: annual stocktaking exercises that help the world assess its current position and decide on necessary course corrections.
Unilateral initiatives, such as the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism and the Deforestation Regulation, face just as much – if not more – pushback, showing that non-multilateral approaches are not necessarily more effective. This highlights the need to improve multilateral systems – by creating new structures or overhauling existing ones – rather than abandoning them. Doing so is ultimately in everyone’s interest.
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Since founding the Eurasia Group, a geopolitical risk advisory firm, more than 25 years ago, political scientist Ian Bremmer has had the ears of political and business leaders around the world, as well as a front-row seat at major multilateral policy conferences. As the author, most recently, of The Power of Crisis: How Three Threats – and Our Response – Will Change the World, he discusses the complexities of pursuing international cooperation and decarbonization in an age of superpower rivalries, geopolitical realignment, and new zero-sum security concerns.
Project Syndicate: In June, the European Union joined the Biden administration in imposing new tariffs on Chinese-made electric vehicles (EVs), citing what it sees as China’s unfair use of subsidies. After long pushing others to forego fossil fuels and pursue cleaner forms of economic development, are the Americans and Europeans losing credibility on this issue – and does that matter?
Ian Bremmer: Tariffs on Chinese EVs are less about losing climate credibility and more about addressing overreliance, competitiveness, and security issues in a chaotic geopolitical landscape. The US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the EU Green Deal are significant steps forward on climate policy, showing a commitment to green energy from both the Americans and Europeans.
Concerns over China’s overcapacity and state subsidies have been mounting, with G7 finance ministers actively seeking to counter China’s non-market policies. The EU is particularly worried about Beijing’s subsidies undermining EU competitiveness in key green and digital sectors. Even Canada is contemplating similar tariffs.
And I expect more to come. There will be further EU efforts to engage China on market access and overcapacity, and where negotiations fail, trade investigations will follow. China won’t quietly back down, though. It has launched anti-dumping probes into European products such as brandy and pork, and it may target automobiles next. This tit-for-tat dispute signals a deterioration in EU-China trade relations, with the EU set to intensify its economic de-risking strategy toward China in the coming years.
Follow the Money
PS: Being especially vulnerable to climate change, low- and middle-income countries across the Global South are open to receiving financial, technical, and other forms of support from wherever they can get it. With China increasingly presenting itself as an attractive option for them, are America and its allies squandering an opportunity here?
IB: At this point, developing economies are open to climate finance support from any quarter. With simultaneous major geopolitical conflicts, inflationary pressures, and pivotal elections happening this year, America and its allies view climate partnerships with emerging markets as a lower priority. The EU’s top priority is Ukraine, and the US has been consumed with the Gaza conflict.
In this context, the Global South will strengthen ties with China and Middle Eastern countries, as we’ve seen happening since the last United Nations Climate Change Conference in Dubai (COP28). Diversifying partnerships makes sense for these governments, since wealthy countries have made it clear they won’t significantly ramp up support anytime soon. Although climate finance will be a major topic at COP29 in Azerbaijan this year, the $1 trillion target will go unmet, leading to frustration and even more collaboration with non-traditional partners.
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Project Syndicate is returning to Climate Week NYC with an even more expansive program. Join us live on September 22 as we welcome speakers from around the world at our studio in Manhattan to address critical dimensions of the climate debate.
Register Now
The donor pool is becoming a contentious topic in UN climate negotiations, because countries like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, South Korea, and China are not currently classified as “developed economies” under official guidelines. The United States and some EU governments are pushing to expand this list to achieve more ambitious goals; but it won’t happen. Many emerging markets support the current list because they don’t want to antagonize China, which firmly opposes being a donor and criticizes developed markets for not delivering on climate finance.
PS: After participating in a Sino-American “track-two dialogue” in Beijing earlier this year, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., expressed confidence that cooperation between the two rival powers is still possible on climate change, among other issues. Do you agree with that, or do the strategic and “national-security” considerations surrounding climate policy and green technologies ensure a zero-sum dynamic?
IB: Cooperation between the US and China on climate change is not only possible but essential. This collaboration has historically set global policy expectations, laying the groundwork for milestones like the Paris climate agreement, COP26 (Glasgow), and COP28. The outcome of the US election will be crucial, but under a Democratic administration, robust climate cooperation could continue, particularly with the right climate envoys.
During the first three years of Joe Biden’s presidency, US Climate Envoy John Kerry (who stepped down earlier this year) and his Chinese counterpart, Xie Zhenhua, demonstrated that meaningful progress can still be made despite broader tensions. After the suspension of climate talks following US Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in 2022, Kerry and Xie’s teams were among the first to resume discussions in 2023.
Of course, future envoys will need to be fully committed to building on these efforts. And even then, separating climate issues from US-China tensions will pose a challenge. Chinese officials have stressed that climate collaboration requires “overall stable relations.”
The Transatlantic Political Climate
PS: US climate policies have also created tensions within the transatlantic world, with French President Emmanuel Macronarguing in December 2022 that the IRA risked “fragmenting the West.” Was that warning overblown, or should we expect the new industrial policies to remain a perennial source of conflict among Western allies even under another Democratic administration?
IB: Macron’s warning about the IRA was political rhetoric. The EU responded with its own green-tech initiative, the European Sovereignty Fund, but failed to agree on how to fund it. Other EU members, like Germany, argued that sufficient resources were already available and underused. If the IRA had posed such a serious threat, the EU would have collectively addressed it more effectively.
PS: What about under a second Trump presidency? How much damage could he do to the net-zero transition, both in the US and globally?
IB: Donald Trump is obviously no fan of climate policies, but he supports US industry. His administration would cut IRA spending, and could do so significantly with full Republican support. These cuts would then ripple through the economy. But despite potential reductions in the IRA, the US would still pursue aggressive industrial policies, challenging economic trade partners. A Trump administration would favor oil and gas, but its impact would be limited. He could open new areas for federal leasing, but because most additional new production is occurring on private land, the effect on overall output would be marginal.
On the international front, a Trump comeback would be a big deal. You could expect a US withdrawal from UN climate talks altogether, which could derail progress at COP30 and significantly reduce funding for developing economies. This could weaken new climate commitments from all governments by 2025, eventually pushing global temperatures higher than currently projected.
PS: Following the strong performance by far-right parties in the European Parliament elections, should we expect Europe’s ambitions under the 2020 EU Green Deal to be scaled back? Even if EU leaders can develop plans to integrate the push for renewable energy fully into the bloc’s defense agenda, will the new political environment let them follow through?
IB: The EU has temporarily peaked in its adoption of environmental policies. Looking ahead, the bloc will largely focus on implementing existing regulations. Key among these is the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive, which will require companies to ramp up disclosures starting next year, with France already imposing strict penalties for noncompliance.
Similarly, the EU Deforestation Regulation will take effect this December, and countries around the world are already preparing for it. Seven key commodities will be barred from the EU market if their sourcing involves any kind of deforestation, legal or illegal.
Meanwhile, the recently adopted Nature Restoration Law – the EU’s flagship biodiversity legislation – requires that member states create action plans and set targets to increase their conservation and restoration efforts. The enforcement of these policies will lead to “transition risks.” Multinational corporations and governments that fail to comply with sustainability-related regulations will face legal action.
Modi-carbonization?
PS: Another elephant in the room is India. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has set highly ambitious decarbonization targets (including reaching net-zero by 2070), but India has also been hoovering up Russian hydrocarbons at a discount and increasing its consumption of coal to support its economic development. Is aggressive decarbonization really compatible with the country’s evolving strategic priorities?
IB: Actually, India’s net-zero target by 2070 is perceived by many as insufficiently ambitious. Several countries and multilateral organizations had advocated for earlier targets. But India faces a tough balancing act between long-term decarbonization and immediate economic priorities. It still relies on coal for domestic security and is being cautious about phasing it out until renewable-energy capacity and alternative revenue sources for coal-producing regions are well established.
Initially, India planned to shift its heavy industries from coal to liquid natural gas, and then to LNG with carbon capture, utilization, and storage or green hydrogen, while emphasizing solar power for homes. But energy-storage limitations, fluctuating LNG prices, and other challenges have prompted a shift toward a combination of LNG and green hydrogen for industry, and a mix of solar and nuclear power for residential areas.
Owing to capital shortages, grid instability, minimal storage solutions, and reliance on emerging technologies, India will not meet its 2030 targets of 500 gigawatts of non-fossil fuel power capacity and a 45% reduction in carbon intensity from 2005 levels. It is, however, expected to build its clean-energy supply chains by 2030 (leveraging a second-mover advantage), and this should help to accelerate its energy transition.
EVs are one bright spot. India has implemented tariffs to protect its budding domestic EV sector, and earlier this year it introduced a new policy to encourage EV manufacturing. This could attract investments worth billions of dollars from companies like Tesla or various Japanese firms.
Managing Expectations
PS: In the past, you’ve called attention to the political hurdles facing multilateral action on climate change, while also proposing new bodies such as a World Carbon Organization (following the model of the World Trade Organization). Where does your thinking stand today? In a world increasingly dominated by zero-sum strategic considerations, is it still realistic to put stock in ambitious multilateral solutions?
IB: Multilateral institutions will continue to face challenges, but they remain essential in an increasingly fragmented world. Their value lies in reaching global consensus and driving coordinated action, as seen with the Paris agreement’s impact on countries, companies, and communities. In that case, there was a clear “before and after.”
Yes, progress has been too slow, and these platforms need reform to fulfill their mandates. But to be fair, expectations for these negotiations are often too high, setting them up for failure. International fora should be seen as what they are: annual stocktaking exercises that help the world assess its current position and decide on necessary course corrections.
Unilateral initiatives, such as the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism and the Deforestation Regulation, face just as much – if not more – pushback, showing that non-multilateral approaches are not necessarily more effective. This highlights the need to improve multilateral systems – by creating new structures or overhauling existing ones – rather than abandoning them. Doing so is ultimately in everyone’s interest.