The Chinese government knows that balancing decarbonization, domestic economic and social stability, and its global aspirations will remain a formidable challenge in the years ahead. But it also recognizes that pursuing climate security represents an economic, social, and political opportunity.
NEW YORK – China’s “dual carbon goal” (双碳, shuang tan) of achieving peak carbon emissions by 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060 reflects the need to maintain domestic stability amid mounting growth challenges. Climate security is integral to President Xi Jinping’s vision of an “ecological civilization” and his comprehensive national security concept. Environmental protection is enshrined in China’s National Security Law, and by addressing climate risks, China can also tackle various socioeconomic challenges.
Hence, in its 2013 National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy, the government warned that climate change threatens food, water, ecological, energy, urban, and personal security. The Climate Adaptation Strategy 2035, issued in 2022, added supply-chain security and systemic financial risks to the list.
The Chinese leadership also sees action on climate change as an important channel for shaping the international agenda. In 2015, then-Premier Li Keqiang declared that China has a responsibility to participate in global governance and promote common development, and in a 2017 speech at a United Nations gathering in Geneva, Xi described climate change as a shared global challenge that calls for a “community of common destiny for mankind.” At the 19th National Congress the same year, the Communist Party of China (CPC) presented itself as a leader in reforming global governance and ushering in a global ecological civilization.
To build a “community of common destiny” – what Chinese state media calls “Xi’s world vision” – Xi announced a global development initiative in 2021, which was followed by a global security initiative in 2022. Both initiatives affirmed China’s commitment to pursue domestic decarbonization, support green and low-carbon development in low-income countries, and foster global cooperation on climate change. Chinese scholars, diplomats, and party theorists have packaged these concepts as “China’s Plan” (中国方案, Zhong guo fang an) to address this century’s big global challenges.
Thus, the CPC views the response to climate change as an opportunity to elevate its international status and authority. By shaping the agenda on green development, it aims to be an active rule-maker, rather than a passive rule-taker. China views the commitment to decarbonization not only as a serious pledge to the global community, but also as a necessary strategy for upgrading its economy and developing competitive advantages in green and low-carbon industries. The government has aligned its industrial policies with the “two carbons,” viewing clean-energy sectors as engines of long-term sustainable growth. “New energy vehicles,” batteries, and solar cells are quickly becoming major drivers of Chinese exports and establishing the country as a global leader in the green industry.
Though Xi has stressed that how China achieves its decarbonization goals “should and must be decided by ourselves and should never be influenced by others,” the CPC leadership seems keenly aware that China’s climate ambitions are not immune to global economic and geopolitical tensions. The influx of low-cost Chinese clean-energy products has stoked trade tensions and provoked a protectionist response from major economies and emerging markets. Since 2023, countries such as Vietnam and Brazil have launched anti-dumping or anti-subsidy investigations against China, and Mexico, the United States, Turkey, and the European Union have imposed new tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles and other goods.
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Such frictions could hinder China’s efforts to decarbonize its own economy and reshape global markets. Yet these aren’t the only risks it faces. Another concerns its dominance as a source of the minerals and metals that are critical to the clean-energy transition. China’s track record of weaponizing these resources has already led the US government to launch the Minerals Security Partnership as a multilateral strategy to secure access to diverse mineral resources and counter China’s dominance.
In the short run, the global competition for critical minerals risks igniting a resource cold war; in the long run, as countries and companies invest in recycling and new technologies based on alternative materials, China’s current advantage will likely diminish. Moreover, as new technologies are developed, China may be left with excessive manufacturing capacity geared toward producing outdated products for which there is shrinking demand.
Although Sino-American cooperation is necessary to address climate change, heightened geopolitical tensions and governments’ emphasis on economic security and prioritization of supply-chain resilience over efficiency are likely to persist. China will continue to encounter trade barriers against its clean-energy exports and restrictions on its access to cutting-edge Western technology.
If these measures force Chinese companies to relocate manufacturing to countries like Hungary, Mexico, and Brazil, it could hollow out the domestic industry, worsening its unemployment problem and threatening domestic socioeconomic stability. In addition to raising the cost of the clean-energy transition globally, protectionism could hurt Chinese corporate profitability, exports, job markets, and household consumption, exacerbating its longstanding macroeconomic imbalances and fueling domestic instability.
Similarly, without access to critical Western technologies, Chinese policymakers may double down on pursuing self-sufficiency and funnel limited resources toward developing them, rather than supporting households. Yet delivering consistent improvement in living standards has been the cornerstone of the CPC’s legitimacy. As China’s economic growth slows, the authorities must either find new growth engines or new sources of legitimacy. In the face of mounting domestic concerns about life-threatening pollution and environmental degradation, ecological protection and climate-change mitigation and adaptation could become one such source.
After all, increasingly frequent and extreme weather events are already disrupting economic activities and causing significant losses. Droughts and floods threaten agricultural production, domestic food supplies, and rural incomes. Extreme heat increases electricity demand, which has forced – and will likely continue to force – China to restart its coal-fired power plants or implement scheduled blackouts.
Balancing decarbonization, sustaining socioeconomic growth and stability, and realizing China’s global aspirations is a delicate dance that promises as much thrill as it does challenges. Chinese leaders and policymakers are acutely aware of the tightrope they walk. Yet they recognize that success in building an ecological civilization could position “China’s Plan” as a compelling alternative to the Western model, one that many developing countries may eagerly embrace.
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NEW YORK – China’s “dual carbon goal” (双碳, shuang tan) of achieving peak carbon emissions by 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060 reflects the need to maintain domestic stability amid mounting growth challenges. Climate security is integral to President Xi Jinping’s vision of an “ecological civilization” and his comprehensive national security concept. Environmental protection is enshrined in China’s National Security Law, and by addressing climate risks, China can also tackle various socioeconomic challenges.
Hence, in its 2013 National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy, the government warned that climate change threatens food, water, ecological, energy, urban, and personal security. The Climate Adaptation Strategy 2035, issued in 2022, added supply-chain security and systemic financial risks to the list.
The Chinese leadership also sees action on climate change as an important channel for shaping the international agenda. In 2015, then-Premier Li Keqiang declared that China has a responsibility to participate in global governance and promote common development, and in a 2017 speech at a United Nations gathering in Geneva, Xi described climate change as a shared global challenge that calls for a “community of common destiny for mankind.” At the 19th National Congress the same year, the Communist Party of China (CPC) presented itself as a leader in reforming global governance and ushering in a global ecological civilization.
To build a “community of common destiny” – what Chinese state media calls “Xi’s world vision” – Xi announced a global development initiative in 2021, which was followed by a global security initiative in 2022. Both initiatives affirmed China’s commitment to pursue domestic decarbonization, support green and low-carbon development in low-income countries, and foster global cooperation on climate change. Chinese scholars, diplomats, and party theorists have packaged these concepts as “China’s Plan” (中国方案, Zhong guo fang an) to address this century’s big global challenges.
Thus, the CPC views the response to climate change as an opportunity to elevate its international status and authority. By shaping the agenda on green development, it aims to be an active rule-maker, rather than a passive rule-taker. China views the commitment to decarbonization not only as a serious pledge to the global community, but also as a necessary strategy for upgrading its economy and developing competitive advantages in green and low-carbon industries. The government has aligned its industrial policies with the “two carbons,” viewing clean-energy sectors as engines of long-term sustainable growth. “New energy vehicles,” batteries, and solar cells are quickly becoming major drivers of Chinese exports and establishing the country as a global leader in the green industry.
Though Xi has stressed that how China achieves its decarbonization goals “should and must be decided by ourselves and should never be influenced by others,” the CPC leadership seems keenly aware that China’s climate ambitions are not immune to global economic and geopolitical tensions. The influx of low-cost Chinese clean-energy products has stoked trade tensions and provoked a protectionist response from major economies and emerging markets. Since 2023, countries such as Vietnam and Brazil have launched anti-dumping or anti-subsidy investigations against China, and Mexico, the United States, Turkey, and the European Union have imposed new tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles and other goods.
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Such frictions could hinder China’s efforts to decarbonize its own economy and reshape global markets. Yet these aren’t the only risks it faces. Another concerns its dominance as a source of the minerals and metals that are critical to the clean-energy transition. China’s track record of weaponizing these resources has already led the US government to launch the Minerals Security Partnership as a multilateral strategy to secure access to diverse mineral resources and counter China’s dominance.
In the short run, the global competition for critical minerals risks igniting a resource cold war; in the long run, as countries and companies invest in recycling and new technologies based on alternative materials, China’s current advantage will likely diminish. Moreover, as new technologies are developed, China may be left with excessive manufacturing capacity geared toward producing outdated products for which there is shrinking demand.
Although Sino-American cooperation is necessary to address climate change, heightened geopolitical tensions and governments’ emphasis on economic security and prioritization of supply-chain resilience over efficiency are likely to persist. China will continue to encounter trade barriers against its clean-energy exports and restrictions on its access to cutting-edge Western technology.
If these measures force Chinese companies to relocate manufacturing to countries like Hungary, Mexico, and Brazil, it could hollow out the domestic industry, worsening its unemployment problem and threatening domestic socioeconomic stability. In addition to raising the cost of the clean-energy transition globally, protectionism could hurt Chinese corporate profitability, exports, job markets, and household consumption, exacerbating its longstanding macroeconomic imbalances and fueling domestic instability.
Similarly, without access to critical Western technologies, Chinese policymakers may double down on pursuing self-sufficiency and funnel limited resources toward developing them, rather than supporting households. Yet delivering consistent improvement in living standards has been the cornerstone of the CPC’s legitimacy. As China’s economic growth slows, the authorities must either find new growth engines or new sources of legitimacy. In the face of mounting domestic concerns about life-threatening pollution and environmental degradation, ecological protection and climate-change mitigation and adaptation could become one such source.
After all, increasingly frequent and extreme weather events are already disrupting economic activities and causing significant losses. Droughts and floods threaten agricultural production, domestic food supplies, and rural incomes. Extreme heat increases electricity demand, which has forced – and will likely continue to force – China to restart its coal-fired power plants or implement scheduled blackouts.
Balancing decarbonization, sustaining socioeconomic growth and stability, and realizing China’s global aspirations is a delicate dance that promises as much thrill as it does challenges. Chinese leaders and policymakers are acutely aware of the tightrope they walk. Yet they recognize that success in building an ecological civilization could position “China’s Plan” as a compelling alternative to the Western model, one that many developing countries may eagerly embrace.