Most of what we think about Iraq is shaped by the daily violence that plagues the country. Intelligence and military analysts debate how much of the violence is due to the presence of foreigners, though it is widely conceded that most of the attacks can be attributed to what American officials call “former regime elements,” with the Iraqi Sunni community the main pillar of the resistance. Having dominated Iraq under Saddam Hussein, and despite numbering less than a quarter of the overall population, Sunnis, it is said, are fighting to prevent their communal interests from being overwhelmed by the majority Shi’ites and the Kurds, a distinct ethnic group concentrated in the north.
Late last year, I was an organizer of a major national survey of Iraqi public opinion that demonstrated the complexity of the country’s communal relations. To be sure, Iraqis of different ethnic or religious backgrounds are divided over many issues, but they also embrace a common national identity, as well as a desire for democracy.
To begin, we asked Iraqis to reflect on the fall of Saddam: Was Iraq better off without him? Among Sunnis, only 23% thought so. Among Shi’ites, however, 87% saw a better Iraq without Saddam. Kurds exceeded this number, with 95% claiming an improvement.
At the same time, overwhelming majorities of Kurds, Sunnis, and Shi’ites – more than eight out of ten – preferred to be seen as Iraqis first, believing that “Iraq will be a better society if people treat one another as Iraqis.” Strong majorities also endorsed the idea of a democratic system for Iraq.
Important divergences re-emerge on social questions. Kurds have a much more egalitarian view of gender relations than either Sunnis or Shi’ites. Asked if university education was more important for boys than girls, 78% of Kurds disagreed. Among Shi’ites, the number disagreeing was 50%. Among Sunnis, the number fell below a majority: only 44% believed in the equal importance of higher education for girls and boys. Similarly, 78% of Kurds rejected polygamy, compared to just 49% of both Shi’ites and Sunnis.
While these findings demonstrate the shadings of opinion across Iraq’s dominant communities, they do not explain attitudes that may be behind the continuing violence that disfigures Iraqi life. The most radical differences in opinion can be found in communal perceptions of control of the future – the possibility of building a better life in post-Saddam Iraq – and security.
At a time when democracy is under threat, there is an urgent need for incisive, informed analysis of the issues and questions driving the news – just what PS has always provided. Subscribe now and save $50 on a new subscription.
Subscribe Now
We asked respondents to indicate how much control they had over their lives and how optimistic they were about the future, using a scale on which ten indicated a highly optimistic sense of control and one a deep level of powerlessness and pessimism.
Kurds had the highest perception of control and optimism, with 19% indicating the highest level of control over their lives and 17% the greatest degree of hope in the future. The comparable figures for Shi’ites were 10 and 14%, respectively, but were just 4% and 5%, respectively, for Sunnis. The results for extreme pessimism were skewed in the opposite direction: 14% of Sunnis thought things were as bad as could be, while only 2% of Kurds and 3% of Shi’ites shared this opinion.
The effects of localized violence were also made clear in the survey: 17% of Kurds, 41% of Shi’ites, and 77% of Sunnis felt that life in Iraq is unpredictable and dangerous, a clear demonstration of the effects of the ongoing resistance that is centered in the Sunni Triangle.
This disparity in attitudes toward the future could determine what eventually happens in Iraq. Widespread political violence in both Iran and Latin America in the 1960’s and 1970’s demonstrated a connection between popular feelings of powerlessness and the growth of urban guerilla movements. Leaders of these groups often defended terrorism by insisting that violence was the only means of bringing hope to demoralized people. This argument, long discredited, resonates in the actions of the Iraqi insurgents and their fanatical allies.
This is not to say that an insecure and demoralized community supports violence. By its immobilization, however, such a community may simply be too passive to oppose the violent men acting in its name. If Iraqi Shi’ite leader Muqtada al-Sadr and his followers chose to stop their own violence, it was not simply because of the superior firepower of the coalition forces. It was because Shi’ite religious leadership felt empowered, optimistic, and secure enough to press the Sadrists to end their revolt.
If the Sunni leadership were to feel that it has a stake in the outcome of political events now unfolding, it would also be able to stop the insurgency. That’s why the political talks – open and clandestine – now reported to be underway are vital. They offer the possibility for the Sunni community to participate in the new system.
The American-led coalition can help by taking more steps that would reinforce a message of hope and optimism for the exhausted and demoralized Sunnis of Iraq. Military action by itself may simply make matters worse.
To have unlimited access to our content including in-depth commentaries, book reviews, exclusive interviews, PS OnPoint and PS The Big Picture, please subscribe
At the end of a year of domestic and international upheaval, Project Syndicate commentators share their favorite books from the past 12 months. Covering a wide array of genres and disciplines, this year’s picks provide fresh perspectives on the defining challenges of our time and how to confront them.
ask Project Syndicate contributors to select the books that resonated with them the most over the past year.
Most of what we think about Iraq is shaped by the daily violence that plagues the country. Intelligence and military analysts debate how much of the violence is due to the presence of foreigners, though it is widely conceded that most of the attacks can be attributed to what American officials call “former regime elements,” with the Iraqi Sunni community the main pillar of the resistance. Having dominated Iraq under Saddam Hussein, and despite numbering less than a quarter of the overall population, Sunnis, it is said, are fighting to prevent their communal interests from being overwhelmed by the majority Shi’ites and the Kurds, a distinct ethnic group concentrated in the north.
Late last year, I was an organizer of a major national survey of Iraqi public opinion that demonstrated the complexity of the country’s communal relations. To be sure, Iraqis of different ethnic or religious backgrounds are divided over many issues, but they also embrace a common national identity, as well as a desire for democracy.
To begin, we asked Iraqis to reflect on the fall of Saddam: Was Iraq better off without him? Among Sunnis, only 23% thought so. Among Shi’ites, however, 87% saw a better Iraq without Saddam. Kurds exceeded this number, with 95% claiming an improvement.
At the same time, overwhelming majorities of Kurds, Sunnis, and Shi’ites – more than eight out of ten – preferred to be seen as Iraqis first, believing that “Iraq will be a better society if people treat one another as Iraqis.” Strong majorities also endorsed the idea of a democratic system for Iraq.
Important divergences re-emerge on social questions. Kurds have a much more egalitarian view of gender relations than either Sunnis or Shi’ites. Asked if university education was more important for boys than girls, 78% of Kurds disagreed. Among Shi’ites, the number disagreeing was 50%. Among Sunnis, the number fell below a majority: only 44% believed in the equal importance of higher education for girls and boys. Similarly, 78% of Kurds rejected polygamy, compared to just 49% of both Shi’ites and Sunnis.
While these findings demonstrate the shadings of opinion across Iraq’s dominant communities, they do not explain attitudes that may be behind the continuing violence that disfigures Iraqi life. The most radical differences in opinion can be found in communal perceptions of control of the future – the possibility of building a better life in post-Saddam Iraq – and security.
HOLIDAY SALE: PS for less than $0.7 per week
At a time when democracy is under threat, there is an urgent need for incisive, informed analysis of the issues and questions driving the news – just what PS has always provided. Subscribe now and save $50 on a new subscription.
Subscribe Now
We asked respondents to indicate how much control they had over their lives and how optimistic they were about the future, using a scale on which ten indicated a highly optimistic sense of control and one a deep level of powerlessness and pessimism.
Kurds had the highest perception of control and optimism, with 19% indicating the highest level of control over their lives and 17% the greatest degree of hope in the future. The comparable figures for Shi’ites were 10 and 14%, respectively, but were just 4% and 5%, respectively, for Sunnis. The results for extreme pessimism were skewed in the opposite direction: 14% of Sunnis thought things were as bad as could be, while only 2% of Kurds and 3% of Shi’ites shared this opinion.
The effects of localized violence were also made clear in the survey: 17% of Kurds, 41% of Shi’ites, and 77% of Sunnis felt that life in Iraq is unpredictable and dangerous, a clear demonstration of the effects of the ongoing resistance that is centered in the Sunni Triangle.
This disparity in attitudes toward the future could determine what eventually happens in Iraq. Widespread political violence in both Iran and Latin America in the 1960’s and 1970’s demonstrated a connection between popular feelings of powerlessness and the growth of urban guerilla movements. Leaders of these groups often defended terrorism by insisting that violence was the only means of bringing hope to demoralized people. This argument, long discredited, resonates in the actions of the Iraqi insurgents and their fanatical allies.
This is not to say that an insecure and demoralized community supports violence. By its immobilization, however, such a community may simply be too passive to oppose the violent men acting in its name. If Iraqi Shi’ite leader Muqtada al-Sadr and his followers chose to stop their own violence, it was not simply because of the superior firepower of the coalition forces. It was because Shi’ite religious leadership felt empowered, optimistic, and secure enough to press the Sadrists to end their revolt.
If the Sunni leadership were to feel that it has a stake in the outcome of political events now unfolding, it would also be able to stop the insurgency. That’s why the political talks – open and clandestine – now reported to be underway are vital. They offer the possibility for the Sunni community to participate in the new system.
The American-led coalition can help by taking more steps that would reinforce a message of hope and optimism for the exhausted and demoralized Sunnis of Iraq. Military action by itself may simply make matters worse.