Two practical questions can be asked of any political system: First, what distinguishes the political parties? Second, who is in charge?
For a while in postcommunist Russia, the answers were blindingly clear: parties were divided between those nostalgic for Soviet times and those who wanted reform. Who was in charge? The president.
After twelve years of transition, the answer to the first question has blurred. With the Communist Party in terminal decline, ideologies are vanishing. Indeed, anybody hoping for an obvious clash of left and right during the recent presidential election campaign was bound to be disappointed, because the answer to the second question is even more emphatic today: President Putin's re-election was never in doubt. This president is very much in charge.
Putin's all-encompassing popularity, which is genuine, and his blurring of all political dividing lines has given him an unassailable position. Many bemoan this state of affairs, but his ascendancy might be less malign than it seems.
Russia's size, the poverty of its infrastructure, and the disarray of its bureaucracy limit Putin's power. Within those limits, he uses his power relentlessly. Sufficient unto themselves behind the Kremlin's walls, Putin and his officials rule in ways more arbitrary and opaque than would be tolerated in a true democracy. The impression Putin's presidency creates is of autocracy punctuated by elections.
Autocracy, not dictatorship. After four years of a presidency supposedly devoted to forging a "dictatorship of law," the rule of law in Russia remains weak and property rights ill defined. A solid middle class has yet to emerge, nor a resilient civil society.
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Privatisation of state assets has done much for the economy, but has also been used for patronage and empire building. The army does not appear to be reliably under civilian control, and the brutal war in Chechnya festers.
So Putin's authoritarianism creeps along, but by Russian standards it is far from being hideously creepy. In some things, indeed, he deserves the thanks of all Russians. He has consigned the Communists to Trotsky's dustbin of history. Now splintering, some seem willing to stop pandering to Bolshevik ghosts. That is good for Russia. Welcome to the republic.
Putin has also not turned the clock back on economic reform. Indeed, the economy has mostly boomed under his stewardship - another reason ordinary Russians like him.
Where Putin has failed is in fostering democratic governance. The question is not just whether he and his ex-KGB cronies muzzle the media and jail their opponents. No, the real flaw in Putin's rule is that his power is personal, not based on the support of a political party.
The central issue in Russian politics is not the battle for votes. More significant by far is the competition for power that takes place in the bowels of the presidency. Barely discernible most of the time, only brief flashes illuminate the battle, as when Mikhail Khodorkovsky was arrested. But whether Putin is master of this system or its prisoner - a tsar or a doge - is something even he may not know.
The emergence of viable political parties requires a strong parliament. But, because Russia's presidency is so powerful, the Duma is largely a squabbling-shop and a fixer's paradise. At best, it is a safety valve for democracy rather than an engine of it.
Of course, there is a big pro-presidential majority party in the Duma. But that is its flaw: it stands only for the president. What he wants, it votes for. But what Russia needs is political parties that stand for something other than their boss's will. Because Putin cannot stomach opposition, he stifles the growth of parties.
Here he gets a helping hand from party politicians, because the reformist parties inspire little confidence. A pessimist surveying last December's Duma election, with its futile party politics, bitterness, and invective, might compare Russia to Weimar Germany.
The reformist "Union of Right Forces," led by Boris Nemtsov and Anatoly Chubais, destroyed itself last December, failing to gain a seat in the Duma. The URF leaders ran an electoral campaign that seemed to revel in their distance from ordinary Russians. Instead of visiting Russians struggling to manage their difficult lives, Nemtsov and Chubais touted themselves as modern men flying about in private jets and fiddling with laptops. Tin political ears deserve defeat.
Compounding the problem of party formation is personal rivalry. Grigory Yavlinsky seems to think he is Charles de Gaulle, waiting at his dacha version of de Gaulle's home in Colombey for a summons to power. His ego alone kept his Yabloko Party from cooperating with the Union of Right Forces.
Putin understands instinctively that Russia needs elements of democracy, if only to distinguish the new Russia from the old, and to let the odd gust of healthy fresh air in. Unchallenged in his second and last term, will he retain even that slight democratic instinct?
The talk today in Russia is of "Putinism," which professes democracy without as yet obliging the state to accept the disciplines of a truly democratic system. But the French have an older word for Putinism: étatisme , which holds that the state commands society rather than serves it.
This does not imply that a government must rule by fear, as past Russian governments did: in this respect, Putin's government is as good as any Russia has ever had. But a "Putinist" government won't have much time for openness, debate, or accountability.
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Two practical questions can be asked of any political system: First, what distinguishes the political parties? Second, who is in charge?
For a while in postcommunist Russia, the answers were blindingly clear: parties were divided between those nostalgic for Soviet times and those who wanted reform. Who was in charge? The president.
After twelve years of transition, the answer to the first question has blurred. With the Communist Party in terminal decline, ideologies are vanishing. Indeed, anybody hoping for an obvious clash of left and right during the recent presidential election campaign was bound to be disappointed, because the answer to the second question is even more emphatic today: President Putin's re-election was never in doubt. This president is very much in charge.
Putin's all-encompassing popularity, which is genuine, and his blurring of all political dividing lines has given him an unassailable position. Many bemoan this state of affairs, but his ascendancy might be less malign than it seems.
Russia's size, the poverty of its infrastructure, and the disarray of its bureaucracy limit Putin's power. Within those limits, he uses his power relentlessly. Sufficient unto themselves behind the Kremlin's walls, Putin and his officials rule in ways more arbitrary and opaque than would be tolerated in a true democracy. The impression Putin's presidency creates is of autocracy punctuated by elections.
Autocracy, not dictatorship. After four years of a presidency supposedly devoted to forging a "dictatorship of law," the rule of law in Russia remains weak and property rights ill defined. A solid middle class has yet to emerge, nor a resilient civil society.
Don’t go back to school without Project Syndicate! For a limited time, we’re offering PS Digital subscriptions for just $50.
Access every new PS commentary, our suite of subscriber-exclusive content, and the full PS archive.
Subscribe Now
Privatisation of state assets has done much for the economy, but has also been used for patronage and empire building. The army does not appear to be reliably under civilian control, and the brutal war in Chechnya festers.
So Putin's authoritarianism creeps along, but by Russian standards it is far from being hideously creepy. In some things, indeed, he deserves the thanks of all Russians. He has consigned the Communists to Trotsky's dustbin of history. Now splintering, some seem willing to stop pandering to Bolshevik ghosts. That is good for Russia. Welcome to the republic.
Putin has also not turned the clock back on economic reform. Indeed, the economy has mostly boomed under his stewardship - another reason ordinary Russians like him.
Where Putin has failed is in fostering democratic governance. The question is not just whether he and his ex-KGB cronies muzzle the media and jail their opponents. No, the real flaw in Putin's rule is that his power is personal, not based on the support of a political party.
The central issue in Russian politics is not the battle for votes. More significant by far is the competition for power that takes place in the bowels of the presidency. Barely discernible most of the time, only brief flashes illuminate the battle, as when Mikhail Khodorkovsky was arrested. But whether Putin is master of this system or its prisoner - a tsar or a doge - is something even he may not know.
The emergence of viable political parties requires a strong parliament. But, because Russia's presidency is so powerful, the Duma is largely a squabbling-shop and a fixer's paradise. At best, it is a safety valve for democracy rather than an engine of it.
Of course, there is a big pro-presidential majority party in the Duma. But that is its flaw: it stands only for the president. What he wants, it votes for. But what Russia needs is political parties that stand for something other than their boss's will. Because Putin cannot stomach opposition, he stifles the growth of parties.
Here he gets a helping hand from party politicians, because the reformist parties inspire little confidence. A pessimist surveying last December's Duma election, with its futile party politics, bitterness, and invective, might compare Russia to Weimar Germany.
The reformist "Union of Right Forces," led by Boris Nemtsov and Anatoly Chubais, destroyed itself last December, failing to gain a seat in the Duma. The URF leaders ran an electoral campaign that seemed to revel in their distance from ordinary Russians. Instead of visiting Russians struggling to manage their difficult lives, Nemtsov and Chubais touted themselves as modern men flying about in private jets and fiddling with laptops. Tin political ears deserve defeat.
Compounding the problem of party formation is personal rivalry. Grigory Yavlinsky seems to think he is Charles de Gaulle, waiting at his dacha version of de Gaulle's home in Colombey for a summons to power. His ego alone kept his Yabloko Party from cooperating with the Union of Right Forces.
Putin understands instinctively that Russia needs elements of democracy, if only to distinguish the new Russia from the old, and to let the odd gust of healthy fresh air in. Unchallenged in his second and last term, will he retain even that slight democratic instinct?
The talk today in Russia is of "Putinism," which professes democracy without as yet obliging the state to accept the disciplines of a truly democratic system. But the French have an older word for Putinism: étatisme , which holds that the state commands society rather than serves it.
This does not imply that a government must rule by fear, as past Russian governments did: in this respect, Putin's government is as good as any Russia has ever had. But a "Putinist" government won't have much time for openness, debate, or accountability.