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What the G20 Can Do for Green Growth

The G20 has both the opportunity and the obligation to lead the way toward new economic growth pathways that are aligned with global climate and development goals. Doing so will require not only new policies and investments, but also a different understanding of the role of government.

LONDON – As finance and climate ministers gather in Washington this week for the annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Group, they should focus on the need for new economic development pathways that are compatible with the Paris climate agreement’s goal of limiting global warming to 1.5° Celsius.

The final report of the Group of Experts to the G20 Taskforce for a Global Mobilization Against Climate Change (which we co-chair) calls on the G20, whose members account for around 85% of world GDP, to advance green industrial strategies supported by comprehensive financial reforms. Development should be oriented around nationally determined contributions (NDCs) – the Paris agreement’s term for countries’ emissions-reduction plans – and governed in a way that emphasizes equity within and between countries.

Without a change of course, global warming is projected to exceed 3°C, leading to a loss of at least 18% of global GDP by 2050. The dominant models of economic growth are pushing the planet toward collapse, with potentially irreversible consequences for people and economies. Since G20 member states are responsible for 80% of current and past greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions, they should be responsible for 80% of the emissions reductions needed to achieve the 1.5°C goal.

The climate crisis is a direct result of economic choices. To change the direction of economic growth so that it respects planetary boundaries, green industrial strategies must go beyond picking favored sectors or technologies. If oriented around achieving “missions” like the NDCs, they can catalyze innovation and investment across many different sectors, thus driving an economy-wide transformation.

Instead of subsidizing specific sectors with few strings attached, governments should seek to open new market opportunities for willing businesses of all sizes, from all sectors. In doing so, they should hold these businesses to a high standard in terms of GHG emissions, wages, support for workers through structural economic changes, and reinvestment of profits in productive activities like research and development. Crucially, to accelerate the transformation we need, governments must repurpose existing fossil-fuel subsidies (which continue to rise), and make public support for fossil-fuel-intensive industries contingent on decarbonization.

Implementing green industrial strategies should not be a task solely for ministries of industry or climate. Whole-of-government engagement and a redesign of key institutions and tools – not least public procurement and public finance – is needed to support NDC targets.

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Green industrial strategy also requires a global lens. We need new global-governance structures that can focus on equity and ensure that all countries benefit from green growth. Since the climate crisis is a global challenge, tackling it requires global collaboration – including through technology- and knowledge-transfer agreements and support for building green manufacturing capacity in low- and middle-income countries.

To that end, green finance must be made more accessible globally. Wealthier countries – especially those that contributed more to historic GHG emissions – should use their greater financial means to help scale up green finance, and to ensure that it is designed to be affordable, patient (long-term), and risk-tolerant.

Without such support, low- and middle-income countries will remain fiscally constrained, inhibiting their ability to invest in green industrial strategies or climate-change mitigation and adaptation. They will be forced into a vicious cycle of increasing climate vulnerability and deteriorating public finances.

The current disparity in the global allocation of green finance is stark. Since 2021, high-income countries and China have attracted over 90% of new clean-energy investment, while borrowing costs for low- and middle-income countries have continued to rise. Though these countries are the least responsible for GHG emissions, they are burdened with a “climate risk premium” that inflates the cost of finance.

Thus, the G20 should champion expanded long-term concessional loans, grants, and debt and liquidity relief so that all countries can pursue green growth without increasing their debt burdens. It should also support existing efforts – such as the Bridgetown Initiative – to achieve a more equitable global financial architecture.

Building on the work of Finance in Common, national development banks should be empowered to scale up patient, NDC-aligned capital, including through strengthened collaboration with multilateral development banks. These institutions are well positioned to direct green finance, drawing on their local knowledge, public mandates, and potential to crowd in private capital that would otherwise shy away from riskier projects.

Finally, a stable financial sector that considers systemic climate risks is crucial for accelerating and sustaining the green transition. The G20 can reinforce the importance of prudential regulators adopting more robust interoperable taxonomies to strengthen disclosures, collecting better data, and improving predictive climate models.

Similarly, central banks have a key role to play in accounting for climate-related financial risks and supporting conditions that encourage more private finance to flow toward green investments – and discourage financial flows to carbon-intensive projects. Doing so would not be a departure from central banks’ existing mandates. In fact, “market neutrality” can have the perverse effect of creating favorable financing conditions for carbon-intensive activities that ultimately threaten macroeconomic and financial stability.

We call on the G20 under Brazil’s presidency to lead the way toward pathways for new economic development, and for the forthcoming South African G20 presidency to take this agenda forward. Green growth is not just possible; it is imperative.

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