European leaders, from Emmanuel Macron to Mario Draghi, have called for the European Union to create its own version of the United States government’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. But this is not a new idea, and attempted clones on the continent have failed to achieve their full potential.
COPENHAGEN/BOSTON – Europe’s waning competitiveness is once again in the spotlight. Addressing this long-standing problem will require, among other things, increased investment in the European economy’s capacity for innovation. To achieve that, recentreports by former Italian prime ministers Mario Draghi and Enrico Letta, and an April speech by French President Emmanuel Macron, have called for a European version of the United States’ Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Most recently, an independent expert group, led by Manuel Heitor, echoed this appeal in the interim evaluation of the European Union’s “Horizon Europe” initiative.
The idea is hardly new. Macron first raised the issue in 2017, and economists have proposed DARPA clones to spur an industrial revival in Germany and accelerate the green transition. In fact, several such institutions already exist in the region, including the European Innovation Council (EIC), Germany’s Federal Agency for Disruptive Innovation (SPRIN-D), and the United Kingdom’s Advanced Research and Invention Agency (ARIA). But all have so far failed to realize the full potential of a European DARPA.
The EU’s innovation agenda is even more urgent now: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has underscored the need to strengthen the bloc’s defense industrial base, and the global artificial-intelligence race has highlighted the importance of dominating in advanced civilian technology. Moreover, these two areas are increasingly interconnected, as was the case for many of DARPA’s biggest achievements, from GPS to Siri (Apple’s digital personal assistant) and drones.
Recreating DARPA’s success in the EU requires understanding how it really works. Established in response to the Soviet Union’s launch of the Sputnik satellite in 1957, DARPA gives its staff the freedom to pursue long-shot ideas. Perhaps most importantly, DARPA has employed a revolutionary research-investment model, which differs from current European practices.
For starters, DARPA takes a targeted approach to addressing specific problems related to US defense and security. In its 2021 congressional overview, for example, the agency emphasized its strategic focus on defending the country, deterring adversaries, and advancing foundational research to solve security challenges. By contrast, ARIA currently works in seven “opportunity spaces,” from precision neurotechnologies to mathematics for safe AI. And while SPRIN-D focuses on fewer issues – circular biomanufacturing, long-duration energy storage, and carbon-to-value applications – none is related to defense.
DARPA’s achievements can also be attributed to its program managers, who have a high degree of decision-making autonomy. After identifying a need or challenge within the overall defense mission, managers define a “technological white space” and select projects that could fill it. While the UK’s ARIA has been able to replicate this approach, European funding agencies continue to rely on an institutionalized peer-review system and selection processes that are long and cumbersome. This slows the pace of innovation and excludes some of the most inventive ideas, causing the EU agencies to lag behind their US peer.
In addition to its narrower defense scope, DARPA has a much larger budget – more than $4 billion per year. By contrast, the EIC awarded a total of €159 million ($173 million) to 43 new projects across five broad challenges in 2023. SPRIN-D has taken a more targeted approach, allocating between €500,000 and €3 million to a smaller number of initiatives. Likewise, ARIA’s grants range from £400,000 ($523,500) to £10 million, but its total funding – less than £1 billion over multiple years – is too limited to have an appreciable impact on its many research areas.
Another important ingredient of DARPA project managers’ success in making audacious and large-scale bets is that they have fewer preconceived notions about which researchers should receive funding and how they should spend it. In 2020, more than 60% of DARPA support went to industry, while less than 20% went to universities and colleges. But most public innovation programs in Europe focus on academia, and political priorities often influence how funds are earmarked.
Moreover, after initial allocations, DARPA project managers use milestones to redistribute funding to well-performing projects and end those that have failed to meet expectations – an approach that makes the most efficient use of available resources and has become the agency’s hallmark. European funders, on the other hand, allocate money with as little organizational overhead as possible and never pull financing from a project that is not achieving its goals.
The case for a European DARPA remains as strong as ever. But to copy the agency’s success in advancing technological innovation, EU policymakers should focus on bolstering collective security – including defense, which is underfunded on the continent. Although SPRIN-D, ARIA, and the EIC have made some improvements to research funding by giving freedom and control to their partners, they have not gone far enough, both in terms of resource allocation and post-award management. The EU can and should develop its own version of DARPA, but only after it understands the pillars on which the agency stands.
COPENHAGEN/BOSTON – Europe’s waning competitiveness is once again in the spotlight. Addressing this long-standing problem will require, among other things, increased investment in the European economy’s capacity for innovation. To achieve that, recentreports by former Italian prime ministers Mario Draghi and Enrico Letta, and an April speech by French President Emmanuel Macron, have called for a European version of the United States’ Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Most recently, an independent expert group, led by Manuel Heitor, echoed this appeal in the interim evaluation of the European Union’s “Horizon Europe” initiative.
The idea is hardly new. Macron first raised the issue in 2017, and economists have proposed DARPA clones to spur an industrial revival in Germany and accelerate the green transition. In fact, several such institutions already exist in the region, including the European Innovation Council (EIC), Germany’s Federal Agency for Disruptive Innovation (SPRIN-D), and the United Kingdom’s Advanced Research and Invention Agency (ARIA). But all have so far failed to realize the full potential of a European DARPA.
The EU’s innovation agenda is even more urgent now: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has underscored the need to strengthen the bloc’s defense industrial base, and the global artificial-intelligence race has highlighted the importance of dominating in advanced civilian technology. Moreover, these two areas are increasingly interconnected, as was the case for many of DARPA’s biggest achievements, from GPS to Siri (Apple’s digital personal assistant) and drones.
Recreating DARPA’s success in the EU requires understanding how it really works. Established in response to the Soviet Union’s launch of the Sputnik satellite in 1957, DARPA gives its staff the freedom to pursue long-shot ideas. Perhaps most importantly, DARPA has employed a revolutionary research-investment model, which differs from current European practices.
For starters, DARPA takes a targeted approach to addressing specific problems related to US defense and security. In its 2021 congressional overview, for example, the agency emphasized its strategic focus on defending the country, deterring adversaries, and advancing foundational research to solve security challenges. By contrast, ARIA currently works in seven “opportunity spaces,” from precision neurotechnologies to mathematics for safe AI. And while SPRIN-D focuses on fewer issues – circular biomanufacturing, long-duration energy storage, and carbon-to-value applications – none is related to defense.
DARPA’s achievements can also be attributed to its program managers, who have a high degree of decision-making autonomy. After identifying a need or challenge within the overall defense mission, managers define a “technological white space” and select projects that could fill it. While the UK’s ARIA has been able to replicate this approach, European funding agencies continue to rely on an institutionalized peer-review system and selection processes that are long and cumbersome. This slows the pace of innovation and excludes some of the most inventive ideas, causing the EU agencies to lag behind their US peer.
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In addition to its narrower defense scope, DARPA has a much larger budget – more than $4 billion per year. By contrast, the EIC awarded a total of €159 million ($173 million) to 43 new projects across five broad challenges in 2023. SPRIN-D has taken a more targeted approach, allocating between €500,000 and €3 million to a smaller number of initiatives. Likewise, ARIA’s grants range from £400,000 ($523,500) to £10 million, but its total funding – less than £1 billion over multiple years – is too limited to have an appreciable impact on its many research areas.
Another important ingredient of DARPA project managers’ success in making audacious and large-scale bets is that they have fewer preconceived notions about which researchers should receive funding and how they should spend it. In 2020, more than 60% of DARPA support went to industry, while less than 20% went to universities and colleges. But most public innovation programs in Europe focus on academia, and political priorities often influence how funds are earmarked.
Moreover, after initial allocations, DARPA project managers use milestones to redistribute funding to well-performing projects and end those that have failed to meet expectations – an approach that makes the most efficient use of available resources and has become the agency’s hallmark. European funders, on the other hand, allocate money with as little organizational overhead as possible and never pull financing from a project that is not achieving its goals.
The case for a European DARPA remains as strong as ever. But to copy the agency’s success in advancing technological innovation, EU policymakers should focus on bolstering collective security – including defense, which is underfunded on the continent. Although SPRIN-D, ARIA, and the EIC have made some improvements to research funding by giving freedom and control to their partners, they have not gone far enough, both in terms of resource allocation and post-award management. The EU can and should develop its own version of DARPA, but only after it understands the pillars on which the agency stands.