LONDON -- Ever since Greek Cypriots rejected the United Nations plan to reunite Cyprus in 2004, antagonism has grown between the Greek majority and the Turks in the north of the island. Turkish Cypriots have withdrawn into Turkey’s embrace and have attempted to gain greater international recognition. Greek Cypriots are using their European Union membership as a weapon to frustrate Turkey’s EU ambitions and to block attempts to increase trade between the EU and the island’s north.
The EU cannot let Cyprus stew in its own juice, not least because as a member state the island is proving an uncomfortable bedfellow. The whole of Cyprus joined the EU in May 2004, but the acquis communautaire – the body of EU law – applies only to areas under direct government control, so it is suspended in those parts administered by Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish government, unwisely, became embroiled with the EU over its plan to extend the customs union to include all new member states, including Cyprus. Meanwhile, the EU has failed to deliver fully on aid and trade pledges to Turkish Cypriots.
Perhaps most worrying of all, if the stalemate over Cyprus continues, it could end Turkey’s chances of joining the EU, as Greek Cypriot intransigence has given succor to other member states that want to keep Turkey out. It might also prevent rapprochement between Greece and Turkey, despite the hopes raised by Greek Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis’s recent visit to Turkey – the first in almost a half-century.
There are plenty of obstacles in the way of a negotiated solution to the Cyprus problem. Just over a year ago, the Finnish EU presidency failed to break the gridlock over the Cyprus trade issue, illustrating again the limited value of trying to agree partial solutions and “confidence-building” measures. The UN’s latest initiative to get low-key, exploratory talks moving is going nowhere. Cypriot presidential elections this month may give a second term to Tasos Papadopoulos, the Greek Cypriot leader who led the “No” campaign in the 2004 reunification referendum.
On the other hand, Turkey’s recent elections returned the same pro-EU government that made a serious attempt to settle the Cyprus problem in 2004. So it’s not all gloom and doom.
Some argue that it would be better to leave Cyprus alone and revisit the problem only in the closing stages of Turkey’s EU accession. These voices are likely to become louder if Papadopoulos is re-elected.
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In my view, such a delay would be a mistake. Turkey would then have to conduct dual negotiations – over Cyprus and over its own EU accession. This would risk overlaps and trade-offs between the two, or a cumulative burden of compromises that might become too great for Turks to accept, potentially wrecking both negotiations at one stroke. For Greek Cypriots, the failure of Turkey’s accession talks in this way would also end any chance of resolving the Cyprus problem.
Both Greek and Turkish Cypriots must take proper responsibility for any solutions that are negotiated and stand behind their decisions during any subsequent referendum campaign. All too often, Cypriots present themselves as helpless pawns in a wider game played by Greece, Turkey, or the “great powers.” There may have been some truth to this in the past, although never to the extent that many Cypriots believe. This time around, only genuine negotiations by both parties − and a mutually accepted settlement − are likely to stand the test of time.
Given the island’s complexity, and Cypriot sensitivity, it would be foolish for an outsider to try to sketch any future settlement. It would, however, seem safe to summarize certain elements at the outset. For example, it would be impractical to drop the basic framework of a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation, which was agreed by both sides as long ago as 1977. Moreover, there seems little doubt that the final, rejected version of the UN’s 2003-04 reunification plan will have to be changed, although earlier versions might contain ideas worth re-visiting.
It may also be constructive to take advantage of transitional provisions linked to Turkey’s EU accession. One earlier UN suggestion was that Turkey complete the withdrawal of its troops from Cyprus when it joined the EU.
At the same time, there are concerns raised by one side that could be settled without any difficulty for the other side. Greek Cypriots were worried, for instance, about the tax bill for the last proposed settlement; an agreement by the EU and other international players to subsidize the plan would cut the potential cost without affecting the Turkish community at all.
The UN, the EU, Greece, Turkey, and UN Security Council members must be united in their support for any renewed effort to reach a settlement. Ever since UN peacekeepers were deployed in 1964, the UN has been the only party acceptable to all sides as a “midwife of compromise.”
While the EU must be present, it cannot be a neutral mediator, since Greece and Cyprus are both members. The Security Council must also give support to the UN’s negotiators and guarantee the provisions of any settlement. This will help to avoid the kind of fears that surfaced in 2004 about implementation of the previous UN plan.
Cyprus suffers from being a second-order problem, one that occasionally flares up, only to be damped down again with short-term palliatives. Many international diplomats are weary of the constant squabbles, endless setbacks, and stubbornness shown in previous negotiations.
But neglect of Cyprus could have serious consequences, especially if its continued division keeps Turkey outside the EU. The future then would be fraught with tension in a part of the world where the EU needs to encourage peace and stability.
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LONDON -- Ever since Greek Cypriots rejected the United Nations plan to reunite Cyprus in 2004, antagonism has grown between the Greek majority and the Turks in the north of the island. Turkish Cypriots have withdrawn into Turkey’s embrace and have attempted to gain greater international recognition. Greek Cypriots are using their European Union membership as a weapon to frustrate Turkey’s EU ambitions and to block attempts to increase trade between the EU and the island’s north.
The EU cannot let Cyprus stew in its own juice, not least because as a member state the island is proving an uncomfortable bedfellow. The whole of Cyprus joined the EU in May 2004, but the acquis communautaire – the body of EU law – applies only to areas under direct government control, so it is suspended in those parts administered by Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish government, unwisely, became embroiled with the EU over its plan to extend the customs union to include all new member states, including Cyprus. Meanwhile, the EU has failed to deliver fully on aid and trade pledges to Turkish Cypriots.
Perhaps most worrying of all, if the stalemate over Cyprus continues, it could end Turkey’s chances of joining the EU, as Greek Cypriot intransigence has given succor to other member states that want to keep Turkey out. It might also prevent rapprochement between Greece and Turkey, despite the hopes raised by Greek Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis’s recent visit to Turkey – the first in almost a half-century.
There are plenty of obstacles in the way of a negotiated solution to the Cyprus problem. Just over a year ago, the Finnish EU presidency failed to break the gridlock over the Cyprus trade issue, illustrating again the limited value of trying to agree partial solutions and “confidence-building” measures. The UN’s latest initiative to get low-key, exploratory talks moving is going nowhere. Cypriot presidential elections this month may give a second term to Tasos Papadopoulos, the Greek Cypriot leader who led the “No” campaign in the 2004 reunification referendum.
On the other hand, Turkey’s recent elections returned the same pro-EU government that made a serious attempt to settle the Cyprus problem in 2004. So it’s not all gloom and doom.
Some argue that it would be better to leave Cyprus alone and revisit the problem only in the closing stages of Turkey’s EU accession. These voices are likely to become louder if Papadopoulos is re-elected.
Secure your copy of PS Quarterly: The Climate Crucible
The newest issue of our magazine, PS Quarterly: The Climate Crucible, is here. To gain digital access to all of the magazine’s content, and receive your print copy, subscribe to PS Premium now.
Subscribe Now
In my view, such a delay would be a mistake. Turkey would then have to conduct dual negotiations – over Cyprus and over its own EU accession. This would risk overlaps and trade-offs between the two, or a cumulative burden of compromises that might become too great for Turks to accept, potentially wrecking both negotiations at one stroke. For Greek Cypriots, the failure of Turkey’s accession talks in this way would also end any chance of resolving the Cyprus problem.
Both Greek and Turkish Cypriots must take proper responsibility for any solutions that are negotiated and stand behind their decisions during any subsequent referendum campaign. All too often, Cypriots present themselves as helpless pawns in a wider game played by Greece, Turkey, or the “great powers.” There may have been some truth to this in the past, although never to the extent that many Cypriots believe. This time around, only genuine negotiations by both parties − and a mutually accepted settlement − are likely to stand the test of time.
Given the island’s complexity, and Cypriot sensitivity, it would be foolish for an outsider to try to sketch any future settlement. It would, however, seem safe to summarize certain elements at the outset. For example, it would be impractical to drop the basic framework of a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation, which was agreed by both sides as long ago as 1977. Moreover, there seems little doubt that the final, rejected version of the UN’s 2003-04 reunification plan will have to be changed, although earlier versions might contain ideas worth re-visiting.
It may also be constructive to take advantage of transitional provisions linked to Turkey’s EU accession. One earlier UN suggestion was that Turkey complete the withdrawal of its troops from Cyprus when it joined the EU.
At the same time, there are concerns raised by one side that could be settled without any difficulty for the other side. Greek Cypriots were worried, for instance, about the tax bill for the last proposed settlement; an agreement by the EU and other international players to subsidize the plan would cut the potential cost without affecting the Turkish community at all.
The UN, the EU, Greece, Turkey, and UN Security Council members must be united in their support for any renewed effort to reach a settlement. Ever since UN peacekeepers were deployed in 1964, the UN has been the only party acceptable to all sides as a “midwife of compromise.”
While the EU must be present, it cannot be a neutral mediator, since Greece and Cyprus are both members. The Security Council must also give support to the UN’s negotiators and guarantee the provisions of any settlement. This will help to avoid the kind of fears that surfaced in 2004 about implementation of the previous UN plan.
Cyprus suffers from being a second-order problem, one that occasionally flares up, only to be damped down again with short-term palliatives. Many international diplomats are weary of the constant squabbles, endless setbacks, and stubbornness shown in previous negotiations.
But neglect of Cyprus could have serious consequences, especially if its continued division keeps Turkey outside the EU. The future then would be fraught with tension in a part of the world where the EU needs to encourage peace and stability.