The EU’s goal is to be a global player with its own foreign policy, one shared by its 27 member states. But if the EU is to develop the military capacity that this requires, political solidarity must be underpinned by effective financial solidarity.
BRUSSELS – Anyone reflecting on the value, weight, and relevance of today’s European military forces for global affairs needs to keep two crucial questions in mind: Where do we want to go? What do we want to achieve?
The EU’s goal is to be a global player with its own foreign policy, one shared by its 27 member states. Any effective foreign policy clearly needs to rely on effective military and civilian resources.
But this goal does not mean that the EU will compete with NATO. Whereas NATO is a political-military alliance, the EU endorses the development of a community of national destinies. Moreover, NATO benefits from the military might of a dominant nation, while the EU must depend on the shared voluntary efforts of its members. For two key reasons, it would be more correct to say that NATO and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) are complementary.
First, certain countries turn specifically to Europe for help. Whether in sub-Saharan Africa or the Middle East, their populations and governments are more inclined – for political, historical, or cultural reasons – to request European rather than NATO assistance. Conversely, there are certain long-term crises, such as those provoked by terrorism, for which NATO is better placed to act.
For example, given its member states’ current resources, the EU, acting alone, would be unable to ensure a Western commitment in Afghanistan. At the same time, the governments of Chad and the Central African Republic would never have accepted NATO’s intervention to help resolve the Darfur crisis.
Second, the EU is building its crisis management know-how on the basis of a global approach. Military resources are only one tool among many others, and, generally speaking, their deployment is clearly defined, limited in time, and coordinated with civilian action. As a result, the EU doesn’t need the articulated military structure that NATO possesses.
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The recent creation in Brussels of the Civilian Planning Conduct Capability, based on a system comparable to that of a military chain of command, demonstrates – and, above all, guarantees – cohesive action. In the same way, EUFOR military commanders regularly and frequently exchange information with the heads of such EU civil missions as the EUPOL police mission, the EUSEC security reform mission, the EUJUST justice mission, and so on, including, if present, the European Commission’s own representatives.
Being able to act militarily requires capable, flexible forces that are suited to their mission. Their essential tasks should be movement, information gathering, and, if necessary, combat. Moreover, their main qualities should be resistance – the ability to hold out – and the psychological resilience to deal successfully with an “intense” situation and to respond to it by exerting the best possible control.
This implies a high level of cohesion, which in the case of multinational forces is not guaranteed. But the EU’s “Battlegroups” are a first response to this requirement. As multinational forces that are built either on regional affiliations or strong bilateral relations, they bestow a “European” label on military resources while guaranteeing efficiency in the field. Where necessary, they can be supported by air and maritime rapid response assets, and thus constitute a fully-fledged military resource for armed intervention.
However, although about 15 Battlegroups have been created – two of which are, at any time, on permanent call for six months – none has actually been deployed since the Artemis “prototype” mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003. As time passes, a concept without real commitment in the field may eventually raise suspicions about its relevance.
The EU also suffers from a well-known lack of capacity in strategic air transport, in-theater air transport, and combat support. The European Defense Agency has a very important role to play in proposing and running programs to address these shortfalls. The Capability Development Plan, which the EDA is developing in close collaboration with the EU Military Committee, aims to foster and improve solidarity in terms of capability, which is what Europe needs.
There are other areas in which we must make progress if the EU’s military resources are to be brought into line with its political ambitions. One urgent need is simplification of our operational planning and the manner in which we conduct operations.
Finally, as all of the EU’s 27 member states are now trying to reduce public spending in sustainable ways, financing for military operations, without which nothing is possible, requires a new approach. Those member states that are most heavily involved in an operation, in terms of both human resources and military equipment, are penalized by the financial burden that this commitment places on their national budgets. Political solidarity must be underpinned by effective financial solidarity.
As an integral part of the CFSP, today’s ESDP and tomorrow’s Common Security and Defense Policy will work only if the member states responsible for implementing them allocate the resources that they need. This implies a Europe-based approach that takes precedence over national considerations once national and European-level foreign policies are unified.
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BRUSSELS – Anyone reflecting on the value, weight, and relevance of today’s European military forces for global affairs needs to keep two crucial questions in mind: Where do we want to go? What do we want to achieve?
The EU’s goal is to be a global player with its own foreign policy, one shared by its 27 member states. Any effective foreign policy clearly needs to rely on effective military and civilian resources.
But this goal does not mean that the EU will compete with NATO. Whereas NATO is a political-military alliance, the EU endorses the development of a community of national destinies. Moreover, NATO benefits from the military might of a dominant nation, while the EU must depend on the shared voluntary efforts of its members. For two key reasons, it would be more correct to say that NATO and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) are complementary.
First, certain countries turn specifically to Europe for help. Whether in sub-Saharan Africa or the Middle East, their populations and governments are more inclined – for political, historical, or cultural reasons – to request European rather than NATO assistance. Conversely, there are certain long-term crises, such as those provoked by terrorism, for which NATO is better placed to act.
For example, given its member states’ current resources, the EU, acting alone, would be unable to ensure a Western commitment in Afghanistan. At the same time, the governments of Chad and the Central African Republic would never have accepted NATO’s intervention to help resolve the Darfur crisis.
Second, the EU is building its crisis management know-how on the basis of a global approach. Military resources are only one tool among many others, and, generally speaking, their deployment is clearly defined, limited in time, and coordinated with civilian action. As a result, the EU doesn’t need the articulated military structure that NATO possesses.
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At a time when democracy is under threat, there is an urgent need for incisive, informed analysis of the issues and questions driving the news – just what PS has always provided. Subscribe now and save $50 on a new subscription.
Subscribe Now
The recent creation in Brussels of the Civilian Planning Conduct Capability, based on a system comparable to that of a military chain of command, demonstrates – and, above all, guarantees – cohesive action. In the same way, EUFOR military commanders regularly and frequently exchange information with the heads of such EU civil missions as the EUPOL police mission, the EUSEC security reform mission, the EUJUST justice mission, and so on, including, if present, the European Commission’s own representatives.
Being able to act militarily requires capable, flexible forces that are suited to their mission. Their essential tasks should be movement, information gathering, and, if necessary, combat. Moreover, their main qualities should be resistance – the ability to hold out – and the psychological resilience to deal successfully with an “intense” situation and to respond to it by exerting the best possible control.
This implies a high level of cohesion, which in the case of multinational forces is not guaranteed. But the EU’s “Battlegroups” are a first response to this requirement. As multinational forces that are built either on regional affiliations or strong bilateral relations, they bestow a “European” label on military resources while guaranteeing efficiency in the field. Where necessary, they can be supported by air and maritime rapid response assets, and thus constitute a fully-fledged military resource for armed intervention.
However, although about 15 Battlegroups have been created – two of which are, at any time, on permanent call for six months – none has actually been deployed since the Artemis “prototype” mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003. As time passes, a concept without real commitment in the field may eventually raise suspicions about its relevance.
The EU also suffers from a well-known lack of capacity in strategic air transport, in-theater air transport, and combat support. The European Defense Agency has a very important role to play in proposing and running programs to address these shortfalls. The Capability Development Plan, which the EDA is developing in close collaboration with the EU Military Committee, aims to foster and improve solidarity in terms of capability, which is what Europe needs.
There are other areas in which we must make progress if the EU’s military resources are to be brought into line with its political ambitions. One urgent need is simplification of our operational planning and the manner in which we conduct operations.
Finally, as all of the EU’s 27 member states are now trying to reduce public spending in sustainable ways, financing for military operations, without which nothing is possible, requires a new approach. Those member states that are most heavily involved in an operation, in terms of both human resources and military equipment, are penalized by the financial burden that this commitment places on their national budgets. Political solidarity must be underpinned by effective financial solidarity.
As an integral part of the CFSP, today’s ESDP and tomorrow’s Common Security and Defense Policy will work only if the member states responsible for implementing them allocate the resources that they need. This implies a Europe-based approach that takes precedence over national considerations once national and European-level foreign policies are unified.